At the beginning of the XXI century the leadership of the Kremlin significantly strengthened control over the processes in the Russian state, achieved certain successes in the implementation of integration projects in the post - Soviet space. To increase the geopolitical weight of the Russian Federation and further strengthen its position on the territory of the so - called "near abroad, Kremlin political technologists developed a new imperial ideology. Ivan Ilyin, a critic of the Bolsheviks and a supporter of monarchism and fascism, acted as an ideological guide for the Russian ruling elite. A practical manifestation of the new ideolog ical approaches was the introduction of the " Day of People"s Unity associated with the traditions of tsarist Russia, which essentially replaced the celebration of the so called " Great October Socialist Revolution " . In the same vein, we can consider the la unch of the action called " Saint George"s ribbon" , which is a kind of attempt to combine the legacy of the Romanovs with the pages of the history of the USSR convenient for the Kremlin. Criticizing the federal nature of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin at the same time actively used the victory of the USSR in World War II for its geopolitic&al purposes. To the greatest extent, this was manifested due to the active popularization of the myth of the " Great Victory ? and the hypertrophied celebration of " Victory Da y the so - called " Pobedobesie ? . One of the important components& of the new state ideology of the Russian Federation was the active use of the " besieged fortress concept. Tough declarations of the leadership of Russia at that time were complemented by d ecisive steps. The use of radioactive substances on the& territory of Great Britain to kill a former employee of the FSB, cyber - attacks on the governmental structure of a NATO and EU member - Estonia, a return to the Soviet practice of aviation combat duty, a missile strike on Georgian territory by &a Russian aircraft demonstrated the readiness of official Moscow to raise the stakes in the framework of the struggle for the redistribution of geopolitical " chessboard ? . The ideological project " Russian World " became the decoration for Russ&ian imperialism and revanchism. During the second presidential term of Vladimir Putin, it was already possible to trace warming signals that unequivocally demonstrated that behind th e " humanitarian" envelope of " Russian World " the aggressive& foreign policy goals of the Russian leadership were hidden. The most openly imperial essence of the Putin regime in its early stages is reflected in the framework of the so - called " Russian doctri ne " . This document included provisions on the& messianic role of Russia, criticism of the Bolsheviks for the division of the USSR into republics, the postulate on the historical continuity of the Russian Federation from tsarist times, etc. In the context of outlining the foreign policy goals &of the Russian Federation, the doctrine refers to the creation of a multipolar world, the non - recognition of the 1991 Belovezh Accords , and the beginning of the path that should lead to the " reunification " of Russia with Belarus, Ukraine and& Kazakhstan is declared.
На початку ХХІ ст. керівництво Кремля суттєво посилило контроль за процесами в російській держа ві, досягло певних успіхів у плані реалізації інтеграційних проектів на пострадянському просторі. Для посилення геополіт&ичної ваги РФ та подальшого зміцнення її позицій на території так званого "близького зарубіжжя" політтехнологи Кремля розробили нову імп ерську ідеологію. В якості ідейного орієнтира для російської правлячої верхівки виступив критик більшовиків, &прихильник монархізму та фашизму Іван Ільїн. Практичним проявом нових ідеологічних підходів стало запровадження пов"язаного із традиціями царської Росії "Дня народної єдності", який по суті замінив святкування так званої "Великої Жовтневої соціал&
З 31.12.2014 по 01.03.2015 Наукова бібліотека читачів не обслуговує.
