Розглянуто ключову спробу мирного врегулювання збройного конфлікту на території Республіки Хорватія (1991-1995) - план Z-4 (Zagreb-4), розроблений і презентований для обговорення хорватській та сербській сторонам у другій половині 1994 - на початку 1995р. групою міжнародних посередників на чолі з американським послом у Загребі Пітером Галбрайтом. Проаналізовано передісторію мирного плану, процес його розробки та втілення, авторство, зміст, дискусії навколо його втілення, а також причини та наслідки провалу. Особливу увагу приділено складнощам у процесі створення Z-4, які були спричинені позиціями держав, що брали участь у мирному врегулюванні хорватсько-сербського конфлікту, а також антагонізмом між Загребом та лідерами самопроголошеної Республіки Сербська Країна. Для написання статті було залучено оригінальні хорватські та англомовні матеріали, зокрема текст Z-4, мемуари осіб, причетних до його розробки, та матеріали ЗМІ.
In this article the author analyze the central attempt of a peaceful negotiation and ending of the war in Croatia (1991-1995) - the plan Z-4 (Zagreb-4), which was created and presented for the discussion to Croatian and Serbian sides in the second half of 1994 and at the beginning of 1995 by a team of international negotiator& from the USA, Great Britain, Russian Federation and Germany with the main role of a US ambassador in Zagreb - Peter Galbraith. The prehistory of this peaceful plan, the process of his preparation and development, its content (it is reviewed profound&ly and cautiously), authorship and as well as discussions around it implementation and outcomes of its failure are considered it this article. The special author"s attention is paid to difficulties that were constantly appearing during the creation o&f the plan Z-4, because of two major reasons, Firstly, they were connected with different views and positions of great powers that were included in a process of Croatian-Serbian normalization and peace negotiations. And secondly, the history of Z-4 w&as highly troublesome because of an enormous level of enmity between Croats and Serbs, between Croatian government and leaders of self-declared Republic of Serbian Krajina, who were directly supported by Belgrade and Serbian president Slobodan Milose&vic. The author engaged original Croatian and other foreign materials - sources and literature, including the text of Z-4, various media and memoirs of the people, which were dealing with a development of this peaceful plan. According to all these ma&terials the author comes to an outcome that the plan Z-4 could be an optimal solution from the Croatian-Serbian war, especially for the Serbian side: due to Z-4 Croatian Serbs would get a high level of territorial autonomy in areas where they compose&d an ethnic majority. Croatian government wasn"t content with such a prospect however it was ready to accept this peaceful plan. But Serbian side was very stubborn that led to the failure of Z-4 and to a military scenario (two major Croatian military& operations in 1995) that eliminated Republic of Serbian Krajina at all.
