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ПОЛІТИЧНІ ПРОБЛЕМИ МІЖНАРОДНИХ ВІДНОСИН

THE CRISIS OF THE ROHINGYA AS A MUSLIM MINORITY IN MYANMAR AND UN RESPONSE TO THE ROHINGYA REFUGEES

КРИЗА БІЖЕНЦІВ РОГІНДЖА ЯК МУСУЛЬМАНСЬКОЇ МЕНШИНИ В М'ЯНМІ ТА РЕАКЦІЯ ООН НА ЦЮ ПРОБЛЕМУ

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> *«Today, nearly one million Rohingya refugees continue*
> *to live in dire conditions….*
> *Addressing the root causes of systematic discrimination,*
> *disenfranchisement and communal violence in Myanmar is critical»*
> *Secretary-General António Guterres*

Abstract. *The purpose of this paper is to analyze the causes and consequences of the forced migration of the Rohingya Muslim minority from Myanmar to the countries of Southeast Asia. The Rohingya problem is considered as composed of various clusters of past and present human rights violations in Myanmar which has caused their forced migration to neighboring countries of ASEAN, such as Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, on boats through the waters of the Malacca Strait and the Andaman Sea.*

This study analyzes the UN responses to manage and resolve the Rohingya problems as well. International initiatives for the introduction of the peace process and mediation services of China to resolve the conflict are studied.

Key words: *ASEAN, Rohingya, Myanmar, South East Asia (SEA), the United Nations (UN), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).*

Анотація. *Метою дослідження є аналіз причин та наслідків вимушеної міграції мусульманської меншини рохінджа з М'янми до країн Південно-Східної Азії. Вважається, що проблема народу рохінджа складається з різних кластерів: минулих і теперішніх порушень прав людини в М'янмі, що спричинило їхню вимушену міграцію до сусідніх країн АСЕАН, таких як Бангладеш, Малайзія, Індонезія, Філіппіни та Таїланд на човнах через води Малаккської протоки і Андаманське море.*

У статті також аналізується реакція та дії ООН щодо вирішення проблем народу рохінджа. Досліджено міжнародні ініціативи із запровадження мирного процесу та посередницькі послуги Китаю задля вирішення конфлікту.

Ключові слова: *АСЕАН, рохінджа, М'янма, Південно-Східна Азія (ПСА), Організація Об'єднаних Націй (ООН), Управління Верховного комісара ООН у справах біженців (УВКБ ООН).*

Introduction. The Rohingyas are an ethnic minority group in the western region of Myanmar, accounting for two thirds of the population of the Rakhine state. They are a religious and linguistic minority from western Myanmar according to the United Nations. The 1 million Rohingyas are different from the Muslim majority linguistically, ethnically, culturally, and

religiously. Myanmar was ruled by the military for over 50 years and during that time period it adopted a lot of racial policies against the Rohingyas. Even today, the state supports discrimination against the Rohingyas in many forms: the Rohingya have very limited access to basic services and viable livelihood opportunities due to strict movement restrictions and denied citizenship rights. This has rendered them one of the largest stateless populations in the world. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres described the crisis of Rohingya as one of, if not the, most discriminated people in the world» [*BBC News*: 2020].

The purpose of research is to analyze the reasons and effects of the crisis of Rohingya and the UN responses to the Rohingya refugees.

Recent literature review. The article is based on a number of scientific works of foreign and domestic authors. The analysis of foreign and Ukrainian publications on this subject demonstrates that foreign researchers highlighted the issue of Rohingya crisis more often and thoroughly. Among domestic researchers Iryna Krupenya first began to highlight this problem and ASEAN response to the Rohingya refugees in her scientific work [*Krupenya, I. The crisis of the Rohingya as a muslim minority in Myanmar and ASEAN's response to the Rohingya refugees*, 2018]. In the context of the spread of modern international conflicts, the Rohingya problem was briefly described by Viktor Patiychuk [*Patiychuk*, *V.,* 2018]. The internal political situation in Myanmar was covered by an expert of the analytical center ADASTRA Maryna Petrenko [*Petrenko, M.,* 2021], an expert public platform in the field of foreign policy «The Maidan of Foreign Affairs» analyzed the events in Myanmar as a conflict with many complications [*Belokolos, O.*, 2017].

There is a large variety of works analyzing analyze the reasons and effects of the crisis of Rohingya and the UN responses to the Rohingya refugees among foreign authors, e.g [Al Imran, Md. Nannu: 2014; Kimberly: 2017; Dwiastut: 2017] etc.

The crisis of the Rohingya as a muslim minority in Myanmar is under constant monitoring by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, foreign television and radio corporation BBC, CNN, Al Jazeera, Deutsche Welle, domestic daily all-Ukrainian newspaper «Day», the English-language newspaper «The Ukrainian Weekly», Ukrainian news agency «RBC Ukraine», Television news service «TCN», an online publication «Radio Svoboda», databases of Human Rights Watch etc.

Main research results. The Rohingya, an ethnic minority of Myanmar (previously known as Burma) is one of the most persecuted groups of people in the world. They speak a version of Chittagonian, a regional dialect of Bengali which is also used extensively throughout south-eastern Bangladesh. The Rohingyas are virtually friendless amongst the Myanmar group of other ethnic, linguistic and religious communities. They were not formally recognized as one of the country's official national groups when the country gained independence in 1947, and they were excluded from both the full and the associate citizenship when these categories were introduced by the 1982 Citizenship Act [Al Imran, Md. Nannu: 2014].

Back in the fifteenth century, history of the Rohingyas can be traced back when Muslims originally migrated to the Arakan Kingdom known today as the Rakhine State, which is a part of Myanmar. Myanmar together with Bangladesh were both British colonies for a time. That being so, Muslims from Bangladesh migrated and made their journey to Myanmar. Majority of the Rohingyas live in the Rakhine State. They represent the largest percentage of Muslims in Myanmar. They claim a long-standing connection to the Rakhine State and identify themselves as a distinct ethnic group with their own language and culture. These claims were successively rejected by the Government of Myanmar, excluding the Rohingyas from the list of recognised 135 ethnic groups of Myanmar [Kimberly: 2017].

The 1982 Citizenship law of Myanmar left the Rohingyas as stateless and rendered them illegal migrants in their own country. According to the new citizenship law, there were three categories of citizens: full, associated, and naturalized citizens. The Rohingyas don't fulfill any of these three criteria. They are the only ethnic group in Myanmar restricted from marriage, traveling beyond their village, or building as well as maintaining religious structures. In addition, they are

subject to frequent forced labor, arbitrary taxation, and sexual violence and land confiscations by the Nasaka. Even, Rohingya women cannot become pregnant without official permission. Some deliver their babies secretly in Bangladesh and many young couples flee to Bangladesh because of the inability to obtain permission to marry in Myanmar.

It has been criticized that the effect of the Burma Citizenship Law 1982 is to make it almost impossible for the Rohingya to gain citizenship. This violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and international norms prohibiting discrimination of racial and religious minorities. The legal and practical constraints imposed by the Burma Citizenship Law 1982 render it «almost impossible» for the Rohingyas to be recognized as the legitimate citizens of Burma [Krupenya: 2018].

Some experts claim that there is evidence that the British armed the Rohingya in 1942 to use them in the confrontation with the Japanese, who then rushed to the borders with India. However, the Rohingya used the weapons they received to exterminate the local Buddhist population, which resulted in the death of about 50,000 people.

The Burmese, on the contrary, naively saw in the Japanese the power to liberate them from colonial British dependence. General Aung San, the founder of independent Burma, also stood in these positions at that time. It is obvious that these ancient events aggravate the relations between the two communities today, which are already quite tense due to competition for land and other resources [Belokolos: 2017].

At the same time, in recent decades, critics have accused the country's Buddhist majority of discrimination and violent oppression of the Rohingya. Every year, thousands of representatives of this people try to escape to predominantly Muslim countries. they are estimated to be up to 400,000 in Bangladesh, a similar number in the Gulf States, some 200,000 in Pakistan, 20,000 in Thailand and 15,000 in Malaysia. UNHCR estimates some 750,000 Rohingyas remain in northern Rakhine state and other parts of Myanmar [Al Imran, Md. Nannu: 2014].

There is an opinion among experts that the Myanmar government denies the Rohingya citizenship because it considers about 1.1 million representatives of this nationality to be illegal migrants from neighboring Bangladesh. Moreover, the Myanmar government accuses the Rohingya of separatism. Myanmar also seems to oppose the use of the name «Rohingya» in UN documents. The country's government is ready to grant citizenship to this minority only if they call themselves Bengalis, which the Rohingya categorically reject [Belokolos: 2017].

The conflict between the Rohingya and the rest of the country's population has become permanent. The deadly violence erupted between ethnic Arakanese Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in early June 2012 in Burma's Arakan State began as sectarian clashes in four townships. When violence resumed in October, it engulfed nine more townships and became a coordinated campaign to forcibly relocate or remove the state's Muslims.

The October attacks were against Rohingya and Kaman Muslim communities and were organized, incited, and committed by local Arakanese political party operatives, the Buddhist monkhood, and ordinary Arakanese, at times directly supported by state security forces. Rohingya men, women, and children were killed, some were buried in mass graves, and their villages and neighborhoods were razed. While the state security forces in some instances intervened to prevent violence and protect fleeing Muslims, more frequently they stood aside during attacks or directly supported the assailants, committing killings and other abuses. In the months since the violence, the Burmese government of President Thein Sein has taken no serious steps to hold accountable those responsible or to prevent future outbreaks of violence.

In the Aung Mingalar area of Sittwe, the Arakan State capital, the government has imposed such severe restrictions on the remaining Muslim residents that they are effectively locked up in their own neighborhood. United Nations officials have been denied access to them.

The violence in October 2012 was clearly much more organized and planned. For months, local Arakanese political party officials and senior Buddhist monks publicly vilified the Rohingya population and described them as a threat to Arakan State. On October 23, thousands of Arakanese men armed with machetes, swords, homemade guns, Molotov cocktails, and other weapons

descended upon and attacked Muslim villages in nine townships throughout the state. State security forces either failed to intervene or participated directly in the violence. In some cases, attacks occurred simultaneously in townships separated by considerable distance.

In the deadliest incident, on October 23 at least 70 Rohingya were killed in a massacre in Yan Thei village in Mrauk-U Township. Despite warning of the attack, only a small number of riot police, local police, and army soldiers were on duty to provide security. Instead of preventing the attack by the Arakanese mob or escorting the villagers to safety, they assisted the killings by disarming the Rohingya of their sticks and other rudimentary weapons they carried to defend themselves.

Satellite images obtained by Human Rights Watch from just 5 of the 13 townships that experienced violence since June 2012 show 27 unique zones of destruction. Images of affected areas in Sittwe, depicting destruction that occurred in June 2012, show 2,558 destroyed structures. Those from 4 of the 9 townships that experienced violence in October show 2,304 destroyed structures. This partial picture of the violence means that at least 4,862 structures were destroyed in Arakan State since June, altogether covering 348 acres of mostly residential property [*Human Rights Watch Report*: 2013].

Since the unrest in 2012, about 200,000 people, mostly Rohingya, have been living in camps in Rakhine. In October 2016, militants of this nationality attacked several police checkpoints, as a result of which many law enforcement officers died. The country's security forces responded with appropriate measures against the rebels. According to the latest information, the State Councilor (de facto head of government) of Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi, has announced the country's readiness to allow Rohingya refugees to return to their homes in Rakhine. The laureate of the Nobel Peace Prize noted that 410,000 refugees will be able to return to their homes in Rakhine if their rights to reside in the country are confirmed [Belokolos: 2017].

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, another serious armed conflict took place in 2020 between government forces and the ethnic Arakan Army in western Myanmar. The intensification of hostilities in some parts of Rakhine State has led to even greater displacement of the population (at least 60,000 people, as of early May 2020) and has shaken the already weak prospects for the voluntary return of the Rohingya people from the camps in Bangladesh.

On March 23, 2020, the day the UN called for a general ceasefire due to Covid-19, the Myanmar government designated the Arakan Army as a terrorist group and resorted to oppression of the mass media reporting on the conflict. On April 1, 2020, ethnic armed groups under the common name Three Brotherhood Alliance: Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta'ang National Liberation extended their own unilateral ceasefire, presenting it as a response to the pandemic. Other armed groups in the country called on the Tatmadaw to also declare a ceasefire, which they did (from 10 May to 31 August 2020), but this did not apply to the conflict with the Arakan Army. However, a ceasefire brokered by Japan between the Arakan Army and the Myanmar Armed Forces in November 2020 allowed dialogue to resume.

The table below shows the number of people killed as a result of the conflict in Myanmar in 2013-2020 [SIPRI Yearbook 2021: p.109–110].

Table 1.

Event type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Combat actions	300	358	1078	155	196	118	1248	380
Explosions /distance violence	45	53	27	35	30	31	85	128
Protests, riots and strategically important events	91	9	0	0	9	9	30	8
Violence against civilians	29	84	162	221	1018	67	132	138
Разом	**465**	**504**	**1267**	**411**	**1253**	**225**	**1495**	**654**

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2021 [8]

Estimates of the number of people killed as a result of the conflict in Myanmar in 2013-2020

[Bar chart showing estimated number of people killed in Myanmar conflict 2013-2020. Y-axis scale from 0 to 1600. Values approximately: 2013 ≈ 460, 2014 ≈ 500, 2015 ≈ 1270, 2016 ≈ 410, 2017 ≈ 1250, 2018 ≈ 220, 2019 ≈ 1490, 2020 ≈ 650. Legend: Ряд 1]

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2021 [8]

The systematic persecution of the Rohingya by the state and the armed conflict with the Arakan Army led to new displacements in 2020. At the beginning of 2020, more than 850,000 Rohingya remained in refugee camps in Cox's Bazar in southern Bangladesh, the largest and most densely populated refugee settlement in the world. Repatriation plans are on hold indefinitely, with no guarantees of citizenship or safety if the Rohingya return to Myanmar. In addition, worsening conditions in the camps forced some Rohingya refugees to seek risky routes to safer places in the region. The situation has worsened amid the Covid-19 pandemic, with countries such as Malaysia closing their borders due to lockdown. In December 2020, the Bangladeshi government began transporting several hundred refugees from Cox's Bazar to Bhasan Char Island in the Bay of Bengal.

Responsibility and justice for the incriminated atrocities against the Rohingya people and other ethnic minorities in Myanmar remained elusive in 2020, despite ongoing trials at the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The Myanmar government's own Independent Commission of Inquiry, established in August 2018 to investigate the actions of the Tatmadaw, rejected allegations of Rohingya genocide, according to a summary report released on January 21, 2020. In two days, the ICC issued a ruling ordering Myanmar to take measures to protect about 500,000 Rohingya who remained in the country. In September, during a video testimony for the International Criminal Court, two military personnel from Myanmar confessed to the killings of the Rohingya. This first admission of human rights abuses by Myanmar's military could be important in the ICC case against Myanmar's military leaders.

The Myanmar government has attempted to implement a comprehensive peace process underpinned by the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement of 2015. This Agreement includes the promise of political negotiations on the creation of a federal union to guarantee future equality and autonomy of ethnic groups. China is an important participant in the peace process, not least because of its economic and security interests. In January 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a two-day visit to Myanmar for the first time in almost 20 years to deepen ties between the two countries. The leading role of the military in politics and the government with a fixed proportion of representation remains a major obstacle to constitutional reform in Myanmar.

Signed in 2015 by eight armed groups (and subsequently by only two smaller groups), the Nationwide Agreement leads to a complex dual peace process involving negotiations with signatories to the Agreement and bilateral ceasefire discussions with non-signatories. In 2020, two more armed groups returned to the peace process – the Karen National Union and the Restoration Council of Shan State. Official meetings with all signatories took place throughout the year, and a three-day peace conference was held in August. But overall, in 2020, the peace process with the signatories of the Agreement made little progress amid continued violence and a focus on the country's second general election after the removal of full military rule [8].

Having studied the position of the world's leading countries on the Rohingya problem, it is worth noting that China fully supports the Myanmar government. Moreover, according to some information, it is in the Rakhine province that the People's Republic of China expects to gain free access to the Indian Ocean, from the coast of which there is a Chinese pipeline supplying oil from the Bay of Bengal to South China. There are also data on China's interest in building a large ocean port worth $7.3 billion and an industrial park with an investment of $3.6 billion in that region.

Russia also sympathizes with Myanmar, with which it carries out military-technical cooperation, and expects to participate in the country's promising nuclear program. India, which is fighting Islamic terrorists on its territory, is also clearly inclined to share the positions of the Myanmar leadership. The US is not interested in an aggravated crisis and encourages Bangladesh to accept refugees from Myanmar. It is also possible that Washington would like to take advantage of the situation to win certain sympathies in the Islamic world [Belokolos: 2017].

At the same time on 21 September 2022 representative from the Human Rights Council in Geneva presented not optimistic report with which warned that unless UN member states change course in the way they collectively respond to this crisis, the people of Myanmar will suffer even further [9].

In 2022 was launched Joint Response Plan (JRP) for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis by co-hosted by the Government of Bangladesh, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR. This is a very important step in the direction of solving the problem of Rohingya migration. Joint Response Plan declared three protection pillars for the Rohingya, in particular:

- working towards and preparing for the sustainable return of the Rohingya refugees/FDMNs to Myanmar by promoting capacity building of the Rohingya that is commensurate with opportunities in Myanmar for their eventual return and reintegration. At the same time, the UN system in Myanmar will also continue to work toward the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return to Myanmar, under the framework of the 2022 Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan;

- securing the identity of Rohingya refugees through continuous registration, as part of the Government of Bangladesh-UNHCR joint registration exercise, and relevant documentation in close consultation with the Government, in an environment respectful of their basic rights to assistance and services, and to facilitate their safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable repatriation to Myanmar.

- promoting a safe and protective environment for Rohingya refugees in close cooperation with the Government of Bangladesh and through ensuring equitable access to basic assistance and protection needs of all refugee women, men, girls, boys, and persons with specific needs. This includes supporting the development of their skills and capacities commensurate with opportunities in Myanmar, addressing and responding to various protection issues including child marriage, domestic violence, and dangerous onward movements by sea, prioritizing disaster risk management, and mitigating potential tensions between the Rohingya refugees and host communities [10].

Conclusions. Based on the conducted analysis, one can draw a conclusion that the crisis is not only Myanmar's internal matter, but it has regional consequences which could pose threat to regional stability. It is obvious that there is an inter-ethnic and religious conflict in Myanmar, steeped in long-standing historical enmity between the Rohingya and Buddhist population, competition for land and other resources, various grievances and accusations, fueled by international Islamists and complicated by the intertwining of interests of influential players.

Responsibility for the Rohingya refugee crisis rests with Myanmar. The Rohingya people have faced systematic disenfranchisement, discrimination, and targeted persecution in Myanmar's Rakhine State for decades. Persecution has repeatedly driven Rohingya refugees across the border into Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Widespread influxes have occurred following violence in Rakhine State from Myanmar into Bangladesh in 1978, 1992, 2012, and again in 2016. By far the largest refugee influx began in August 2017. The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar concluded that the root causes of this exodus included crimes against humanity and other grave human rights violations.

To address this humanitarian crisis, should be following steps: provide for the Rohingyas full citizenship status and rights. The conditions mentioned in the 1982 citizenship rights must be removed; the government of Myanmar should take back all the Rohingyas who have fled to different parts of Asia due to military operations against them in their country. Also, a safe zone should be demarcated for the Rohingyas in Myanmar where they can live after their return; the process of further «Burmanisation» of Myanmar should be stopped.

In the near future, we should hardly expect a complete resolution of the Rohingya migration crisis. The Myanmar government is clearly not ready to make any concessions now. It is believed that the primary task of the international community should be to provide urgent humanitarian aid to all victims and exert pressure on all parties to the conflict in order to prevent new exacerbations.

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DIFFERENTIATON OF "INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL COOPERATION", "CULTURAL DIPLOMACY" AND "PUBLIC DIPLOMACY" CONCEPTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

ВІДМІННОСТІ МІЖ ПОНЯТТЯМИ «МІЖНАРОДНЕ КУЛЬТУРНЕ СПІВРОБІТНИЦТВО», «КУЛЬТУРНА ДИПЛОМАТІЯ» ТА «ПУБЛІЧНА ДИПЛОМАТІЯ» В ПОЛІТОЛОГІЧНІЙ НАУЦІ

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Abstract. The article deals with the *concepts of "international cultural cooperation", "cultural diplomacy" and "public diplomacy" which are not identical. Cultural and public diplomacy are noted to have clearly determined goals, aimed at ensuring national interests. It is emphasized that international cultural cooperation, in contrast to cultural relations, does not arise spontaneously, but as the result of purposeful actions of subjects. The tools of public diplomacy are mentioned to aim at the public in other countries, while cultural diplomacy targets the governments. It was determined that international cultural cooperation can be carried out both on bilateral and multilateral basis. Attention is paid to development of international cultural cooperation to maintain peace, based on understanding of the peculiarities of cultures of other states.*

Key words: *international cultural cooperation, cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, cultural relations, international cooperation, preservation of cultural heritage.*

Анотація. *В статті доведено, що поняття «міжнародне культурне співробітництво», «культурна дипломатія» та «публічна дипломатія» не є тотожними. Відзначається, що у культурної та публічної дипломатії наявні чітко детерміновані цілі, які полягають у забезпеченні національних інтересів. Наголошується, що міжнародне культурне співробітництво, на відміну від культурних відносин, не виникає органічно, а є результатом цілеспрямованих дій суб'єктів. Відзначається, що інструменти публічної дипломатії направлені на громадськість інших країн, натомість культурна дипломатія таргетує уряди інших країн. Визначено, що міжнародне культурне співробітництво може здійснюватися як на двосторонній, так і на багатосторонній основі. Акцентується увага на необхідності розвивати міжнародне культурне співробітництво для підтримання миру, заснованому на розумінні особливостей культур інших держав.*

Ключові слова: *міжнародне культурне співробітництво, культурна дипломатія, публічна дипломатія, культурні відносини, міжнародне співробітництво, збереження культурної спадщини.*

Statement of the problem. It is worth mentioning that at the present stage of international relations, the use of terms "international cultural cooperation", "cultural diplomacy" and "public diplomacy" should be corrected and regulated. This problem is becoming more and more topical within the context of implementation of public diplomacy strategy; in particular, the Public Diplomacy Strategy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (MFA) 2021-2025 stated: "The main directions of public diplomacy are cultural, economic, expert, culinary, scientific and educational, sports and digital diplomacy" [Stratehiia Publichnoi Dyplomatii Ministerstva Zakordonnykh Sprav Ukrainy 2021-2025, 2021]. That is, in the above-mentioned document, cultural diplomacy is defined as a component of public diplomacy.

In December 2015, the Department of Public Diplomacy was established in the MFA of Ukraine, and a special unit was created within the structure of the Department of Public Diplomacy to deal with cultural diplomacy [21], which once again confirms the prevailing understanding of cultural diplomacy as an integral part of public diplomacy. Thus, it can be assumed that due to the lack of understanding of the above-mentioned terms, it is quite likely that the instruments of cultural and public diplomacy are misused.

The purpose of the article is to establish the conceptual difference in the meanings of "international cultural cooperation", "cultural diplomacy" and "public diplomacy", because in case of the incorrect use of tools of cultural and public diplomacy, international cultural cooperation without differentiation of understanding of these categories may potentially reduce the effectiveness of foreign policy of Ukraine in general.

Analysis of recent research and publications. In Ukrainian scientific discourse, the main attention of scholars is devoted to distinguishing the concepts of "public policy" and "strategic communications". In particular, the research papers of domestic scientists: O. Domanska [Domanska, 2014], D. Dubov [Dubov, 2017], S. Dubova [Dubov, 2017], S. Kot [Kot, 2014], V. Lytovchenko [Lytovchenko, 2013] and others deal with this problem. Among foreign researchers, the names of I. Wei [Wei, 2015], E. Pajtinka [Pajtinka, 2014], Chahine J. [Chahine, 2010], J. S. Nye [Nye, 2008], T. Riverra [Riverra, 2015] and others should be mentioned. As a rule, the papers were focused on separate studies of cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy and international cultural cooperation.

Slovak researcher E. Pajtinka compared cultural and public diplomacy in his works, but international cultural cooperation was left out of his attention [Pajtinka, 2014]. Ukrainian experts D. Dubov and S. Dubova studied the phenomenon of cultural diplomacy in the context of strategic communications development [Dubov, 2017]. S. Kot's research paper is devoted to participation of Ukraine in international cultural cooperation concerning prevention of illegal export of cultural values and their return to the countries of origin, while the definition of "international cultural cooperation" is not defined in his article [Kot, 2014]. V. Lytovchenko paid much attention to international cooperation in the field of cultural heritage preservation, but the definition of international cooperation in the field of culture is not given [Lytovchenko, 2013].

The core of research. The term "public diplomacy" came into widespread use in the 1960s to describe aspects of international relations that were distinct from traditional diplomacy. While traditional diplomacy is limited to open contacts between governments whether in the form of direct communication between leaders or through official representatives of the administrations involved, public diplomacy, on the contrary, refers to the exchanges that take place between the government of one country and the general public (from leaders' opinion to mass audience) [Chahine, 2010: 20]. Public diplomacy itself involves exclusively interaction with the public of other countries, while interaction with the governments of other countries is excluded. Public diplomacy can be defined as diplomatic activity when the government is the initiator, the public is the object, and relevant political measures, including foreign policy, are implemented through cultural exchanges, mass media, social networks and other means [Pajtinka, 2014: 74].

The main function of public diplomacy is aimed at changing of behavior of the government of the target country. Public diplomacy is often seen in the context of soft power. Thus, according to

J. S. Nye, public diplomacy is designed to transform general resources into the resources of soft power [Nye, 2008: 101].

Public diplomacy is aimed at the public of a foreign country. It is worth to demonstrate how public diplomacy works: a diplomatic mission organizes an event to which the people of the host country are invited. It can be a photo exhibition, an ethnic festival, etc. Citizens of the host country attend this event, they will get additional knowledge about the country, about the situation in it, which should be converted into supporting actions of the government of the event-organizing country. In case when the government of the host state is not ready to provide necessary assistance to a certain state, the tools of public diplomacy are designed to encourage the population of the host state to put pressure on their governments to transform their foreign policy. For example, in February-March 2022, European states were very cautious about providing military aid to Ukraine, so the President of Ukraine V. O. Zelensky appealed directly to the people of certain countries via video link, often during rallies in support of Ukraine in the central squares of the cities. The President of Ukraine asked the people of these countries for support of Ukrainian people in the fight against the aggressor. It was an instrument of public diplomacy. The use of social networks and media to spread information concerning the current situation also belongs to the tools of public diplomacy.

The concept of public diplomacy cannot be equated with the concept of "cultural diplomacy". The main content of cultural diplomacy revolves around the concept of "culture", therefore it is impossible to define the concept of "cultural diplomacy" without revealing the meaning of the "culture" concept. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) defines culture as a complex of special spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional characteristics of a society or social group, which includes not only art and literature, but also a way of life, a way of living together, systems of values, traditions and beliefs [UNESCO Framework For Cultural Statistics, 2009].

The very concept of "cultural diplomacy" does not currently have a universally accepted unified definition. Understanding of this concept depends on the context of the use of the term and the country where this term is used, as well as its national interests and foreign policy priorities.

Two approaches of understanding cultural diplomacy can be distinguished. The realistic paradigm of the study of international relations considers cultural diplomacy to be a tool of foreign policy, which is aimed at realizing national interests and is fully correlated with the general line of the state's foreign policy.

The idealistic paradigm of the study of international relations considers cultural diplomacy to be an instrument for seeking mutual understanding between states in order to build peace. Constructivists agree with idealists regarding the main goal of cultural diplomacy, but at the same time they do not completely exclude the possibility of using it for realization of national interests, as despite the fact that the tools of cultural diplomacy can contribute to finding mutual understanding between countries by spreading knowledge about the cultural features of the state, cultural diplomacy acts as a continuation of foreign policy, which is primarily aimed at implementation of national interests.

The next feature of cultural diplomacy is purposefulness of actions, that is, cultural diplomacy does not emerge by itself, it needs a strategy, defined goals, mechanisms and tools for its implementation. Cultural diplomacy is aimed at the governments of other states, its goal is to establish cooperation in the cultural sphere with the government of another state, and then, basing on these achievements, to develop bilateral relations in the political, economic and other spheres.

The key elements of activities within the framework of cultural diplomacy are promotion and assistance to cultural subjects of the accreditation state in spreading its national culture and cultural identity in the host state, which may be expressed in the provision of logistical, technical, organizational or other assistance to representatives of culture, sports, cultural institutions, to relevant non-governmental organizations by the state of accreditation in the host state.

The level and nature of assistance depend on the goals of cultural diplomacy in the corresponding state, the conditions of the host state. In those states where the level of cultural

infrastructure development is relatively low, diplomatic missions are more actively involved in the organization of tours or other cultural events, in some cases diplomatic missions take over the functions of event organizations. In addition, permanent diplomatic representations can independently organize various cultural events, such as exhibitions, classical music concerts, etc. In most cases, such cultural events are timed to commemorative or festive days in the country of accreditation and can take place in the premises of the diplomatic mission.

The topic of events for cultural activities is determined by the diplomatic representation of the state of accreditation, which must be related to the defined goals of its foreign policy. For instance, during February – September 2022, all cultural events organized by the Embassy of Ukraine in France were concentrated on dissemination of information concerning the RF aggression against Ukraine [20].

Common features of both cultural and public diplomacy are that they are initiated by governments and carried out mainly by diplomatic representatives. However, at the same time, governments can use other subjects of international relations as their instruments, for example, non-governmental state organizations or international non-governmental organizations. Bright example of such a situation is the activities of the British Counsil and Goethe Institute, which are not formal parts of the state apparatus, but fully act as instruments of cultural and public diplomacy and are in close interaction with national governments. Thus, the British Council regularly reports to the British Parliament on its activities and is partially financed from the budget of the United Kingdom [Rivera, 2015: 32].

Not all activities that fall within the scope of cultural diplomacy are carried out referring to the public abroad and, therefore, cannot be considered as part of public diplomacy. For example, negotiations on international treaties regulating cultural relations between states are undoubtedly an important part of cultural diplomacy. At the same time, it is carried out by diplomats of one state in relation to their colleagues (and not to the public) in another state, and therefore cannot be considered as part of public diplomacy. Another reason why cultural diplomacy cannot be equated with public diplomacy, is the fact that public diplomacy can include not only activities carried out within the framework of cultural diplomacy, but also in other areas of diplomacy. For example, a public presentation conducted by an economic attache in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the host country, aimed at investments or trade promotion, is an integral part of economic diplomacy (since the economic interests of the state are at stake here, first of all), but, at the same time, it can obviously be considered as a part of public diplomacy (due to the socially oriented nature of this type of activities).

The concepts of cultural diplomacy and cultural relations are not identical. R. Arndt divides the concept of "cultural diplomacy" and "cultural relations" basing on the criterion of the government's role. "Cultural relations" means literally the relations between national cultures, those aspects of mental activities and education which are embedded in any society and which tend to cross borders and interact with foreign institutions. Natural and organic development of cultural relations is going on without government intervention. Cultural diplomacy can be spoken of only when official diplomats working for national governments try to shape and direct this natural flow of relations to advance national interests [Arndt R.,2005: 20].

Cultural diplomacy is fundamentally different from international cultural cooperation. In order to define the concept of "international cultural cooperation", it is necessary to define what "international cooperation" is.

Accordingly, international cooperation reflects such a process of interaction between two or more actors, in which the use of armed violence is excluded and joint search for realization of common interests is dominating [Derriennic, 1977: 76]. International cooperation cannot be contrasted with conflict, but international cooperation can be considered as a means of preventing extreme, crisis forms of a conflict. Two actors are in a state of cooperation when each of them can be satisfied only when the other actor is satisfied. Thus, the result of such relations can be two options: when both actors achieve this goal or both are simultaneously dissatisfied [Derriennic, 1977: 110].

International cooperation assumes the presence of three elements: common goals of partners, their expectations of benefits resulted from the interaction, the mutual nature of these benefits [Milner, 1992: 468].

In essence, cooperation should lead to gaining certain bonuses, benefits, preferences by all participants of this cooperation, that is, all its participants should benefit from cooperation [Keohane, 1984: 18]. If, in their relations, any states try to reduce the benefits of the other side from this interaction or prevent other parties from receiving benefits, then such actions cannot be attributed to the kinds of international cooperation, on the contrary, they can be characterized as competitive behavior or a conflict [Milner, 1992: 467].

It is not so easy to achieve resultative international cooperation in world politics, as a joint government was never created to ensure compliance with the rules, the UN cannot claim the role of an international government. However, sometimes states still manage to achieve cooperation. In addition, there is a practice of states achieving national interests while establishing international cooperation.

The level of cooperation between certain states varies depending on the subject of cooperation and may be different in different periods of time [Milner, 1992]. International cooperation covers interaction between different types of sides (subjects) (i.e., not only interstate, but also transnational ones), and at different scales (bilateral and multilateral, regional, global ones, etc.).

Accordingly, international cultural cooperation is the cooperation of two or more international actors in the field of culture. All cultural events require a process of cooperation between people and groups. Creativity, although perceived as an individual process, has previous and subsequent phases of cooperation that affect its results. Processes of education and gaining skills of expression and creativity are actions that take place before cultural manifestation, since we can consider education to be a wide process of cooperation. On the other hand, cultural creative works require cooperation for the processes related to their exhibition, sale, promotion, maintenance, etc. Thus, culture requires cooperation at many levels.

International cultural cooperation can be bilateral or multilateral. Multilateral international cultural cooperation can be carried out within the framework of international and non-governmental organizations.

International cooperation intensified after the end of the Second World War, because it was with the end of this global conflict that the then leaders of the largest world states came to realization that it is impossible to establish a strong and long-lasting peace between states without close cooperation in the field of culture and pursuing an effective intercultural dialogue that would contribute to the development of understanding between peoples. This concept was embodied with the creation of the United Nations and its specialized United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) [Lewis, 1971: 6].

International cultural cooperation covers participation of all social agents: state authorities, private sector and civil society. The functions of the government include promotion, stimulation and encouragement of international cultural cooperation. However, international cultural cooperation is not the exclusive prerogative of the government; for example, the international cooperation of the P. Virsky Ukrainian National Folk Dance Ensemble and the world famous Georgian National Ballet "Sukhishvili" also belongs to international cultural cooperation. Another example of international cultural cooperation is the creation of joint movies. Thus, the creation of the joint Ukrainian-Polish "With Fire and Sword" movie (1999) made a significant contribution into the development of cooperation between Ukraine and Poland in the cultural sphere, in rethinking over joint historical events, and the search for reconciliation and understanding.

The concept of international cultural cooperation is based on the belief that every culture possesses its own unique value, and regarding this, the important tasks of all mankind are to respect the principle of respect for each culture and the preservation of the culture of each people.

Despite the fact that a huge amount of interactions within the framework of international cultural cooperation takes place at the level of collectives, cultural and artistic figures, the government support for cultural and social projects can give impetus to cooperation entering a new stage, which will certainly lead to general acceleration in the development of the field.

Responsibility for the development of the own culture rests with the state, and international cultural cooperation should create favorable conditions for the simultaneous and synchronous development of all fields of culture in order to prevent a significant gap between scientific and technical progress and the moral and intellectual progress of mankind [Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation, 1966].

Among the goals of international cultural cooperation, defined in the Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation, adopted by the UNESCO General Conference at its fourteenth session, Paris, 4 November 1966, the spread of knowledge, promotion of the enrichment of different cultures are distinguished; development of peaceful relations and friendship between peoples and promotion of a better understanding of the way of life of each people; promoting the implementation of the principles proclaimed in UN declarations; providing every person with access to knowledge and the opportunity to enjoy the art and literature of all nations, to participate in the progress of science in the world, to contribute to the enrichment of cultural life; improvement of material and spiritual conditions of human life in all corners of the world, are distinguished [Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation, 1966].

The above-mentioned Document stipulates that cultural cooperation should reveal ideas and values that can contribute to the establishment of peace and friendship between countries, it should prevent hostility in relations [Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation, 1966]. However, we must state the fact that despite the long-term cooperation between Ukraine and Russia in the cultural sphere, the Russian Federation carried out the armed aggression against Ukraine.

Among the main directions of international cultural cooperation, support for creative activities can be highlighted; as well as training and internship of cultural workers; joint creation and exchange of cultural values and cultural goods, for example, joint movie production; restoration of unique monuments of history and culture; research to establish the unique cultural value of the object; creation and introduction of new technologies, technical means, equipment for cultural activities, for example, new methods of finding out the age of cultural objects, cooperation between libraries, archives and other cultural institutions; popularization of artistic and cultural values of other countries; holding conferences, scientific meetings and symposia on cultural topics; organization of youth leisure; exchange of specialists in the field of culture; mutual business trips and internships of scientists specializing in art, architecture, etc.; creation of new cultural values; introduction of measures to preserve historical and cultural monuments; joint production of printed products; implementation of direct contacts between cultural workers; mutual tours of cultural workers; holding festivals of creativity; organizing and holding competitions and contests in the field of arts, for example, the International Delphi Games, etc.

The distinguished feature of international cultural cooperation is its mutual benefit, that is, it takes place only when there are mutual benefits for all parties. If one side receives significantly greater benefits from this interaction, then such interactions cannot be attributed to international cultural cooperation.

International cultural cooperation, unlike cultural relations, is characterized by purposefulness of actions and clear intention, since cultural relations emerge organically [Rivera, 2015: 10]. The situation that developed after the discovery of America by the Europeans in the 15th - 16th centuries may be given as an example to demonstrate differences between the considered concepts. Thus, after the first ships of Europeans reached new lands, communication arose between the colonizers and the local population, when representatives of different peoples learned about the cultural characteristics of other peoples, thus cultural relations between the peoples of America and Europeans emerged. As a result of these cultural relations, Europe learnt about new types of vegetables: corns, potatoes, eggplants. Accordingly, Europeans tried to introduce their culture – this

is how the missionary movement was initiated, which aimed to spread knowledge about religion and God among other peoples. Missionary activities can be also called public diplomacy, because these actions were directed specifically at the public of new countries. Such a hypothetical situation could have been called international cooperation if tribal leaders had agreed with representatives of other governments on mutual exchange of cultural values or land cultivation technologies. Cultural diplomacy was then a purposeful policy of the Spanish government to spread information about the culture and religion of Spain among the leaders of the newly opened lands.

Conclusions. Culture is an important element in establishment strong mechanisms of international cooperation that meets the requirements of the current situation.

Cultural and public diplomacy is the exclusive prerogative of the government, instead, international cultural cooperation can be carried out by both governments and other subjects: from international governmental organizations to creative collectives.

The instruments of cultural diplomacy are aimed at the governments of other states, whereas public diplomacy targets exclusively the foreign public. International cultural cooperation can take place both in a multilateral and bilateral formats, while cultural and public diplomacy involve interactions between representatives of the two countries.

International cultural cooperation should be carried out in compliance with the principle of reciprocity, all parties of the interaction should receive relatively equal benefits, while public and cultural diplomacy are aimed exclusively at realization of the national interests of the state.

In international cultural cooperation, states by definition must pursue the goals of achieving mutual understanding between peoples, exchange of cultural achievements for the sake of establishing peace, therefore, when conducting cultural and public diplomacy, states first of all try to influence the governments of other states in the context of conducting their foreign policy.

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THE RUSSIA OF "EARLY PUTIN" IN SEARCH OF A NEW NATIONAL IDENTITY: MODERN IMPERIAL IDEOLOGY IN THE SHADOW OF THE "HUMANITARIAN" "RUSSIAN WORLD"

РОСІЯ "РАННЬОГО ПУТІНА" В ПОШУКАХ НОВОЇ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ ІДЕНТИЧНОСТІ: МОДЕРНА ІМПЕРСЬКА ІДЕОЛОГІЯ В ТІНІ "ГУМАНІТАРНОГО" "РУСЬКОГО МИРУ"

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Abstract. *At the beginning of the XXI century the leadership of the Kremlin significantly strengthened control over the processes in the Russian state, achieved certain successes in the implementation of integration projects in the post-Soviet space. To increase the geopolitical weight of the Russian Federation and further strengthen its position on the territory of the so-called "near abroad", Kremlin political technologists developed a new imperial ideology. Ivan Ilyin, a critic of the Bolsheviks and a supporter of monarchism and fascism, acted as an ideological guide for the Russian ruling elite.*

A practical manifestation of the new ideological approaches was the introduction of the "Day of People's Unity" associated with the traditions of tsarist Russia, which essentially replaced the celebration of the so called "Great October Socialist Revolution". In the same vein, we can consider the launch of the action called "Saint George's ribbon", which is a kind of attempt to combine the legacy of the Romanovs with the pages of the history of the USSR convenient for the Kremlin. Criticizing the federal nature of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin at the same time actively used the victory of the USSR in World War II for its geopolitical purposes. To the greatest extent, this was manifested due to the active popularization of the myth of the "Great Victory" and the hypertrophied celebration of "Victory Day" − the so-called "Pobedobesie".

One of the important components of the new state ideology of the Russian Federation was the active use of the "besieged fortress" concept. Tough declarations of the leadership of Russia at that time were complemented by decisive steps. The use of radioactive substances on the territory of Great Britain to kill a former employee of the FSB, cyber-attacks on the governmental structure of a NATO and EU member − Estonia, a return to the Soviet practice of aviation combat duty, a missile strike on Georgian territory by a Russian aircraft demonstrated the readiness of official

Moscow to raise the stakes in the framework of the struggle for the redistribution of geopolitical "chessboard".

The ideological project "Russian World" became the decoration for Russian imperialism and revanchism. During the second presidential term of Vladimir Putin, it was already possible to trace warming signals that unequivocally demonstrated that behind the "humanitarian" envelope of "Russian World" the aggressive foreign policy goals of the Russian leadership were hidden.

The most openly imperial essence of the Putin regime in its early stages is reflected in the framework of the so-called "Russian doctrine". This document included provisions on the messianic role of Russia, criticism of the Bolsheviks for the division of the USSR into republics, the postulate on the historical continuity of the Russian Federation from tsarist times, etc. In the context of outlining the foreign policy goals of the Russian Federation, the doctrine refers to the creation of a multipolar world, the non-recognition of the 1991 Belovezh Accords, and the beginning of the path that should lead to the "reunification" of Russia with Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan is declared.

Keyword: *Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, imperialism, foreign policy, "Russian World", revanchism.*

Анотація. *На початку XXI ст. керівництво Кремля суттєво посилило контроль за процесами в російській державі, досягло певних успіхів у плані реалізації інтеграційних проектів на пострадянському просторі. Для посилення геополітичної ваги РФ та подальшого зміцнення її позицій на території так званого "близького зарубіжжя" політтехнологи Кремля розробили нову імперську ідеологію. В якості ідейного орієнтира для російської правлячої верхівки виступив критик більшовиків, прихильник монархізму та фашизму Іван Ільїн.*

Практичним проявом нових ідеологічних підходів стало запровадження пов'язаного із традиціями царської Росії "Дня народної єдності", який по суті замінив святкування так званої "Великої Жовтневої соціалістичної революції". В цьому ж ключі можна розглядати започаткування акції під назвою "Георгіївська стрічка", яку є своєрідною спробою поєднати спадщину Романових із зручними для Кремля сторінками історії СРСР. Критикуючи федеративну сутність Радянського Союзу, Кремль водночас активно використовував для своїх геополітичних цілей перемогу СРСР у ІІ світовій війні. Найбільшою мірою це проявилося через активну популяризацію міфу "Великої перемоги" та гіпертрофоване святкування "Дня Перемоги" – так зване "побєдобєсіє".

Одним із важливих компонентів нової державної ідеології РФ стало активне використання концепту "оточена фортеця". Жорсткі декларації з боку керівництва Росії в цей час доповнювалися рішучими кроками. Використання на території Великобританії радіоактивних речовин для вбивства колишнього співробітника ФСБ, кібератаки на урядову структури члена НАТО та ЄС – Естонії, повернення до радянської практики чергувань стратегічної авіації, ракетний удар по грузинській території російським літаком демонстрували готовність офіційної Москва піднімати ставки в рамках боротьби за перерозподіл геополітичної "шахівниці".

Декорацією для російського імперіалізму та реваншизму став ідеологічний проект "русский мир". Вже впродовж другої президентської каденції Владіміра Путіна можна було простежити тривожні сигнали, які недвозначно демонстрували що за "гуманітарною" обгорткою "русского миру" приховуються агресивні зовнішньополітичні цілі керівництва РФ.

Найбільш відверто імперська сутність путінського режиму на його ранніх стадіях відображена в рамках так званої "Руської доктрини". Цей документ включив у себе положення про месіанську роль Росії, критику більшовиків за поділ СРСР на республіки, постулат про історичну тяглість РФ від царських часів тощо. В контексті окреслення зовнішньополітичних цілей РФ, в доктрині йдеться про створення багатополярного світу,

невизнання Біловезьких угод 1991 р. та задекларовано початок шляху, який має довести до "воз'єднання" Росії з Білоруссю, Україною та Казахстаном.

Ключові слова*: Російська Федерація, Владімір Путін, імперіалізм, зовнішня політика, "Русский мир", реваншизм.*

Introduction

"He's a democrat, and he knows the West... He will continue the Yeltsin line on democracy and economics and widen Russia's contacts ..." [Memorandum of Conversation. Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin, no date, p. 565–566].

On November 19, 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999) and US President Bill Clinton (1993-2001) met in Istanbul in the framework of the OSCE summit. During the conversation, the Russian president described the then Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, with the above words. As the first president of Russia later claimed, he was wrong in terms of understanding who Vladimir Putin is [Kasianov: Yeltsyn zhalkuvav, shcho obrav Putina svoim nastupnykom, i pid chas nashoi zustrichi meni priamo pro tse skazav]. The successor of Boris Yeltsin became the creator of another Russia, the key features of which are authoritarianism, imperialism and expansionism. The signs of Russia's transformation in the appropriate direction already became clearly visible during Vladimir Putin's second presidential term (2004-2008).

Volodymyr Horbulin, Viktor Kotyhorenko, Roman Lunkin, Hryhorii Perepelytsia, Oleh Rafalskyi, Yuriy Svidlov, Timothy Snyder, Andreas Umland, Liudmyla Shanhina and many other Ukrainian and foreign researchers in their scientific works considered various aspects of the formation of the ideological foundations of Putin's Russia, especially the issue of associated with the ideological project "Russian world". Based on the results of their research, the authors of the article made an attempt to reveal the beginnings of the formation of the modern imperial ideology based on the ideas of Ivan Ilyin, the introduction of the "besieged fortress" concept, and the implementation of the "Russian world" ideological project into active "political circulation" during the second presidential term of Vladimir Putin (2004 – 2008).

Presentation of the main research outcomes. The expansion of the powers of the central authorities in the Russian Federation, the adoption of legislative innovations useful for the presidential administration and pro-presidential political forces, the switch of a number of important media resources to become Kremlin controlled, the renationalization and establishment of control over big businesses and other changes during the first presidential term of Vladimir Putin (2000 – 2004 r.) significantly strengthened his control over processes in the middle of the state [Hurak and Tsependa, 2021, p. 65] and gave Zbigniew Brzezinski the reason to call the second Russian president the "Moscow Mussolini" [Bzhezinskyi, 2006, p. 80] in September 2004. At the same time, official Moscow demonstrated increasing activity in the international arena. Initiatives related to the creation of EAEC, Eurasian Economic Space, CSTO, ignoring international agreements, playing with "military muscles" testified to the growing ambitions of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet space and the desire to strengthen its geopolitical weight [Hurak and Tsependa, 2021, p. 58–59, 65–66].

At the beginning of the XXI century Putin's team demonstrated its readiness to be part of the West on the condition of recognizing Russia as one of Washington's main allies and agreeing to its hegemony in the CIS space. The reluctance of leading Western actors, primarily the United States, to such a compromise gave rise to the growing dissatisfaction of official Moscow. Ultimately, after the tragic events in Beslan and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Russia "left the orbit of the West", choosing an alternative path of development [Trenin].

Strengthening control over processes in the middle of the state, new initiatives in the CIS space, supplemented by a beneficial situation in the energy markets objectively contributed to the reinforcement of the international positions of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the Kremlin was convinced that in the future the "power of the word" will have more and more weight and the ideological confrontation between the countries will grow [Vladislav Surkov. Suverenitet – ehto politicheskij sinonim konkurentosposobnosti]. The creator of "sovereign democracy",

Vladislav Surkov [Mishchenko], traditionally characterized the Soviet Union critically. However, he believed that one of the two greatest achievements of the USSR was "powerful ideological work that was deployed on a planetary scale" [Vladislav Surkov. Suverenitet – ehto politicheskij sinonim konkurentosposobnosti]. Accordingly, the second presidential term of Vladimir Putin became a period when the Russian Federation paid serious attention to the formation of a new comprehensive ideology. On the one hand, it was supposed to consolidate Russian society around the ruling elite led by Vladimir Putin, and on the other hand, to contribute to strengthening the position of the Russian Federation in the world.

Historian Timothy Snyder believes that among the thinkers of the 20th century Ivan Ilyin had the greatest influence on modern world politics [Snaider, 2020, p. 27]. In particular, it is about the influence that this Russian philosopher of the first half of the 20th century had managed to the leadership of the Russian Federation headed by Vladimir Putin. As part of the Annual Address to the Federal Assembly dated April 25, 2005, the second Russian president voiced a philosopher's quote about the relationship between state bodies and citizens [Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation]. In the following years, Vladimir Putin repeatedly cited Ivan Ilyin during his iconic speeches. Following him, Ilyin's thoughts were used by Dmitry Medvedev, Sergey Lavrov, Vladislav Surkov, and other influential Russian figures [Barbashin].

The Kremlin also took the initiative to rebury the ashes of Ivan Ilyin in Russia, who spent the last years of his life in Switzerland [Il'in den']. In October 2005, the ashes of the philosopher were buried in Moscow on the territory of the Donskoy Monastery with the participation of Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Alexy II [Prah generala Denikina i filosofa Il'ina perezakhoronili v Moskve]. In the following year as part of the presidential program "For Reconciliation and Consent", the archives of Ivan Ilyin, which were previously stored at the University of Michigan, were brought to the Russian Federation [Il'in den']. In 2009, according to the words of Archimandrite Tikhon, who is close to Putin, the then Prime Minister of the Russian Federation financed the construction of Ilyin's grave monument with his own funds [Putin vozlozhil cvety k mogilam "gosudarstvennikoV" – Denikina, Il'ina, Solzhenicyna].

The reasons for such attention to the figure of the philosopher lie in his writings. For Ivan Ilyin, Russia is a stronghold of "universal peace and balance". He claimed that "Western nations do not understand and cannot tolerate Russian uniqueness" and will try to divide Russia, using "freedoms", "democracy", and "federalism", which he used in quotation marks [Ivan Aleksandrovich Il'in. Izbrannoe]. For Ilyin, Russia has always been a victim of the European "continental blockade". It could not do anything wrong. From his point of view, the participation of Russians in any wars was "self-defense" [Snaider, 2020, p. 32].

According to Ilyin, it is possible to prevent a negative development of events for Russia only under the condition of the formation of "the Russian national dictatorship, which will take the strong "reins of power" into its hands" [Ivan Aleksandrovich Il'in. Izbrannoe]. The philosopher did not support the rule of law, but he used the definition of "law" in his works. By it he understood the connection between the whims of the leader and the subjection of all others. For the monarchist Ilyin, the leader is "a Russian patriot who will lead Russia to salvation", who "sees the future of politics and knows what should be done" [Snaider, 2020, p. 37] and who, following the model of Mussolini, is endowed with "masculinity". From Ilyin's point of view, the Russian masses had to shift all the whims of their leader into the language of legal obligation. From Ilyin's point of view, the leader of Russia is obliged to fight and has the right to choose in which war to fight. War, from the philosopher's point of view, is a useful thing that does not threaten, but protects the Russian "national body".

Ilyin had no doubts that post-Soviet Ukraine must be part of Russia. For the philosopher, talking about Ukraine meant being a fierce enemy of Russia [Snaider, 2020, p. 31, 35]. He put the word "Ukrainians" in quotation marks and predicted that "imperialist neighbors" would try to take over parts of Russia, using, among other things, Ukrainian separatism to dismember it [Ivan Aleksandrovich Il'in. Izbrannoe].

It is worth emphasizing that not all of Ivan Ilyin's views are openly popularized in Russia. In particular, his followers deliberately avoid the facts that the philosopher was a supporter of fascism, that he was inspired by Adolf Hitler and saw in Benito Mussolini a hope for the betterment of the world [Snaider, 2020, p. 27–28]. Interestingly, Ilyin remained true to his views even after emigrating from Germany to Switzerland in 1938 and the defeat of the Nazis during World War II. In 1948, Ilyin argued that fascism was right despite the fact that it made many mistakes [Mishchenko].

Ivan Ilyin's views formed the ideological basis for the Putin regime. Regardless of how openly they are declared by the Kremlin adepts, the facts demonstrate attempts at their systematic implementation into practice, starting from the period covered in the work. In particular, on January 1, 2005, changes to the Labor Code of the Russian Federation, which related to public holidays, entered into force. According to the innovations, the "*Day* of *agreement and reconciliation*" became a working day; instead, one of the main Russian official holidays became the "Day of People's Unity", which is celebrated on November 4 [Pchelov, 2005, p. 138; Zabuttiu pidliahaie. Yak "Velykyi zhovten" stav malym]. The new holiday, which from 1649 until the Bolshevik coup in 1917 was the day of honoring the Kazan icon of the Mother of God, was timed to the liberation of Moscow from Polish troops in November 1612 [Odin noyabr' odnoj strany. Chto my vsyo-taki prazdnuem 4 i 7 noyabrya]. In order to understand the essence of the proposed change, it is worth recalling one of Vladislav Surkov's interviews, which he gave already after leaving the post of assistant to the President of Russia. So, in June 2021, the long-time assistant of Vladimir Putin, revealing the goals that led to the appearance of a new holiday, frankly noted that "This day has become a day of Russian nationalism in its essence. There was a task to speak about the empire, about our desire to expand, but at the same time not to offend the world community" [Ukraina i Russkij mir v interv'yu s Vladislavom Surkovym; Vosstanie poddannykh…"].

2005 was marked by another innovation. During the large-scale celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory of the USSR in the so-called "Great Patriotic War" [Inostrannye delegacii na yubileyakh Pobedy v Moskve] on May 9, at the initiative of one of the leading Russian propaganda channels – "RIA Novosti", the "Saint George's ribbon" action was launched in the Russian Federation [Chto oznachaet Georgievskaya lenta?]. After the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the so-called "Saint George's ribbon" became one of the symbols of the aggressive policy of the Kremlin. It should be borne in mind that this ribbon, which Russian propagandists associated with World War II and the "Order of Glory" introduced in 1943 and was called the "Guards ribbon" in the 1940s. Instead, the real "Saint George's ribbon", which looks similar to it, was introduced by Catherine II in 1769 as an addition to the Order of St. George and during World War II was used by Russian military formations such as General Vlasov's Russian Liberation Army, which fought alongside Nazis [Heorhiivska strichka…].

Considering the approaches of Putin and his entourage to the Soviet heritage, it is worth noting a pronounced dualism. On one hand, on April 25, 2005, as part of the Annual Address to the Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin said the well-known phrase that "the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century" [*Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation*]. It is worth emphasizing that the aforementioned address was not the first public speech in which the second Russian president openly demonstrated that, in his opinion, the collapse of the USSR was harmful to Russia and Russians. The topic of "unity" also occupied one of the central places in Vladimir Putin's interview for the leading Ukrainian TV channels on October 26, 2004 [Hurak and Tsependa, 2021, p. 60–61]. Then, among other things, he emphasized that Russians and Ukrainians were the most affected by the collapse of the USSR, asserted that the inhabitants of the post-Soviet space are doing the right thing when they worry about "the loss of the Soviet Union", etc [Interview on Ukrainian Television Channels UT-1, Inter and 1+1].

For the second Russian president, who tried to accumulate international efforts in order to form a multipolar world with the Russian Federation as one of the centers of gravity, the USSR was a role model in terms of influence on the international arena. As a result, one of the ways of increasing the international authority of the Russian Federation, which was used by the Kremlin's

political technologists, was the popularization of historical moments related to Soviet themes, primarily the victory of the Red Army over fascist troops during World War II. However, Vladimir Putin has traditionally been critical of the essence of the Soviet Union [Putin rasskazal uchenym o podryvnoj roli Lenina v rossijskoj istorii]. For the second Russian president, the creators of the USSR were short-sighted politicians who, dividing the USSR into republics, laid a "delayed action mine" under the "construction of a unitary state, which was called "Russia" [Vladimir Putin. Vechernij razgovor (1991, 2002). Ch. 2]. During his first two presidential terms, Vladimir Putin made considerable efforts to turn the federal basis of the Russian Federation into a fiction. It is clear that according to such approaches, the unitary Russian Empire was a model to emulate, and not the Soviet Union, which consisted of 15 republics.

Starting with the second presidential term of Vladimir Putin, the celebration of "Victory Day" with the "Saint George's ribbon", the "Immortal Regiment" movement and other initiatives became an important component of spreading narratives useful for the Kremlin. The hypertrophied celebration of "Victory Day" – the so-called "Pobedobesie" – became a way to return to Russians a sense of pride that Russia is a country of winners [New York Times: Rosiia skoiuie novi zlochyny cherez nevyznannia starykh], which, as Vladimir Putin claimed in 2010, could defeat fascist Germany without the help of Ukrainians [Putin vvazhaie, shcho Rosiia u Velykii Vitchyznianii peremohla b i bez Ukrainy]. The myth of the "Great Victory", in which there is no room for uncomfortable moments, such as the secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Russian propaganda will later also in a certain way tie to the war against Ukraine, justifying its aggression by opposing the "neo-Nazis" [New York Times: Rosiia skoiuie novi zlochyny cherez nevyznannia starykh]. At the same time, taking into account that as a result of the World War II, the sphere of influence of the USSR covered half of Europe, the myth of the "Great Victory" objectively generates and retransmits updated imperial ideologies [Potapenko, 2015, p. 115–116] to geographically much wider spaces.

One of the important components of the new state ideology of the Russian Federation was the introduction of the "besieged fortress" concept into the political mainstream, which gradually acquired a pronounced anti-American orientation. During Vladimir Putin's first term as president, official Moscow's criticism of the West was usually voiced through representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. The President, on the other hand, showed restraint in his statements at that time [Menkiszak, 2003, p. 218; Menkiszak, 2004, p. 211–212].

After Putin's re-election for a second presidential term, the situation changed. Already in May 2004, during a speech before the Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin emphasized that not everyone in the world wants to deal with an independent, strong and self-confident Russia [Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossijskoj Federacii, 2004]. After the tragic events in Beslan in early September 2004, the president's rhetoric became even tougher. Immediately after the end of the operation in North Ossetia, Vladimir Putin, without pointing at anyone, emphasized that "some would like to tear from us a "juicy piece of pie". Others help them They help, reasoning that Russia still remains one of the world's major nuclear powers, and as such still represents a threat to them And so they reason that this threat should be removed..." [*Address by President Vladimir Putin*].

Shortly after the Supreme Court of Ukraine annulled the results of the second round of the Ukrainian presidential elections published by the Central Election Commission of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin on December 7, 2004, alluding to the leading countries of the West, expressed his dissatisfaction, pointing out that there is a situation where "good, but a strict uncle in a pith helmet " indicates who in which way "must live", and those who argue are punished "with the help of a bomb rocket baton"[Putin ob Ukraine: "Nedopustimo, chtoby shli ugrozy v adres lyudej"].

In May 2006, as part of the Message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, speaking in his usual sarcastic manner, called the USA a "wolf" that "knows who to eat, as the saying goes. It knows who to eat and is not about to listen to anyone, it seems" [*Annual Address to the Federal Assembly*]. In the future, the United States, which was the main addressee of

the official Kremlin's foreign policy [Menkiszak, 2007, p. 178], became the main target of Russian criticism on the international stage.

Starting from the second half of 2006, the introduction of sanctions by the American side against the *Sukhoi Company* and *Rosoboronexport* in July of 2006 and January of 2007 in connection with the supply of weapons by Russia to Iran, Syria and Venezuela became a significant irritant for official Moscow in terms of relations with the United States [Menkiszak, 2007, p. 179]. Russia's position in the American direction became especially edgy when the official Washington's initiative to place elements of the American anti-missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic acquired real outlines. On February 1, 2007, Vladimir Putin held a press conference in the Kremlin, during which he expressed doubts that the mentioned system is directed against threats from Iran, as it was declared by the official Washington [Putin – Argumenty za razmeshchenie sistemy PRO v Evrope nesostoyatel'ny]. In the future, the issue of placing the anti-missile defense system in Central-Eastern Europe, which, with the planned installation of ten interceptor missiles, did not pose a threat to the Russian nuclear potential in general [Amerikanskaya sistema PRO v svete ritoriki i faktov], was a traditional topic for discussion at almost all events with the participation of Vladimir Putin [Ezhegodnaya bol'shaya press-konferenciya; Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossijskoj Federacii, 2007; Stenogramma pryamogo tele- i radioehfira].

Vladimir Putin voiced the most completely and comprehensively anti-Western foreign policy approaches of the Russian Federation during his second presidential term during the "Munich Speech" on February 10, 2007. Then he condemned the "an almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in international relations… a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law", attempts to resolve a given questions, "according to so-called issues of political expediency, based on the current political climate". Also, denying sovereign states the right to choose the means of their defense, Vladimir Putin harshly criticized the North Atlantic Alliance for its willingness to expand. The Russian president devoted a significant part of his speech to the United States. It was to the actions of the USA that Vladimir Putin linked most of the international problems existing at that time [Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy].

The readiness of the Russian leadership to raise the stakes in the context of confrontation with the West can also be traced through the prism of concrete practical steps. The November 2006 poisoning by Russian special services in London of Alexander Lytvynenko, a former FSB employee and critic of the Putin regime, for which polonium-210 was used, demonstrated the transition to new forms of the Kremlin's defense of its interests, which included the use of radioactive substances on the territory of NATO and the EU [YeSPL: Rosiia vidpovidalna za vbyvstvo Lytvynenka u Brytanii; Zhyttia i smert Oleksandra Lytvynenka]. In April – May 2007, during the transfer of the so-called "Bronze Soldier" in Tallinn, cyberattacks were carried out on state institutions of the member of NATO and EU from computers belonging to Russian government departments, and activists of pro-Kremlin youth movements blocked the Estonian embassy for several days in Russia [Hensek NATO vyslovyv pidtrymku Estonii].

As part of further raising of the stakes in the international arena, in the summer of 2007, Russia carried out a number of demonstrative and provocative actions. In particular, in July, a decision was taken to suspend Russian participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. During August, training of the Russian military was conducted on the Elbrus massif at an altitude of 4.5 km, flights of the Russian strategic aviation over the Arctic, Pacific and Atlantic oceans were carried out, Russia's return to the Soviet practice of aviation combat duty was declared. On August 6, 2007, a Russian aircraft violated Georgian airspace and launched a missile attack on a newly installed radar located near the border with South Ossetia [Menkiszak, 2008, p. 192–194].

It is interesting that Vladimir Putin, while gradually increasing his criticism of the USA, resorting to demonstrations of force and provocative steps, at the same time maintained close relations with the American President George Bush. The situation did not change even after the "Munich speech". Official meetings of the presidents of the Russian Federation and the USA were traditionally accompanied by informal family dinners. It came to the point that George Bush drove

Vladimir Putin to the presidential residence in Novo-Ogaryovo in the personal car of the head of the Kremlin – a rare 1956 "Volga" [Putin nauchil Busha vodit' "21-yu VolgU"], and Vladimir Putin was the first head of a foreign state whom George Bush hosted at his parents' villa in Kennebunkport [Vstrechu Putina i Busha v SSHA soprovozhdali demonstracii protesta].

Also, expressing critical remarks about the USA during the "Munich speech", Vladimir Putin simultaneously called George Bush his friend and a decent person [Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy]. In April 2008, the last meeting between Vladimir Putin and George Bush as the heads of the Russian Federation and the United States took place in Sochi. George W. Bush's national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, later emphasized her "warm and somewhat nostalgic" tone. He also drew attention to the fact that after British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the 43rd American president met Vladimir Putin most often, and such meetings were always accompanied by frank conversations [Bush i Putin zalozhili osnovu dlya dal'nejshego sotrudnichestva dvukh stran].

The imperial ideology and the besieged fortress concept, promoted by the Kremlin, could not be openly declared and serve the promotion of the Russian Federation on the international arena. In order to spread narratives useful for the Kremlin abroad, Russian diplomacy resorted to the active use of "humanitarian" means of influence. As a result, the leadership of Russia began to systematically work on the realization of its geopolitical goals, emphasizing the support of the Russian language, literature, theater, and music in countries near and far abroad. The ideological project "Russian world" was used to ideologically strengthen integration initiatives under the patronage of the Russian Federation and create its own global value space by official Moscow [Ukraina ta proekt «russkoho myra»: analit. dop., 2014, p. 52]. He became a decoration behind which the true essence of Putin's regime was hidden.

The very phrase "Russian world" was first proposed in 1998 by the philosopher Pyotr Shchedrovsky as part of the preparation for the Russian government of the concept of the policy of the Russian Federation towards the CIS [Russkij Mir: vosstanovlenie konteksta]. The first steps related to the introduction of the "Russian world" project into wide "political circulation" were taken during the first presidential term of Vladimir Putin. In particular, in February 2004, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov, speaking about "fellow Russians in the countries of the near and far abroad", used the term "Russian world" during a speech at VIII World Russian People's Council [Vystuplenie ministra inostrannykh del Rossijskoj Federacii I.S. Ivanova…].

In 2006, Vladimir Putin joined the popularization of the project. For the first time, he spoke about "Russian world" on October 24, 2006, during a speech at the World Congress of Compatriots. Remembering the "Day of People's Unity" introduced in 2005, the Russian president emphasized that it unites "the whole so-called Russian world". Vladimir Putin included the "multinational people of Russia" and "millions of our compatriots abroad" in this definition [Nikakie granicy ne pomeshayut nashemu edinstvu…].

In the following year, the concept will be supplemented with new political aspects. In particular, as part of the Annual Address to the Federal Assembly dated April 26, 2007, Vladimir Putin noted that the Russian language, which is the "living space of the multi-million Russian world", is the language of the "historic brotherhood of nations". At the same time, he emphasized that "care for the Russian language, the growth of the influence of Russian culture is a very important social and political issue" [Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossijskoj Federacii, 2007]. Exactly one month before that, Vladimir Putin approved the "Review of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation" prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which among the tasks of the state was defined "permanent worldwide assistance in strengthening the ties of compatriots with the historical Motherland, the formation of the "Russian world" as a unique element of universal human civilization" [Obzor vneshnej politiki Rossijskoj Federacii].

The definition "Russian world" was also included in the new version of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved at the beginning of Dmitry Medvedev's presidential term in July 2008. In the paragraph devoted to international humanitarian law and human rights, it

was noted that Russia is considering – "the multimillion Russian diaspora – the Russian world – as a partner, including for expanding and strengthening the space of the Russian language and culture" [The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation]. It is worth emphasizing that the relevant provisions were included in a significantly wider context in which it was said about "international cultural and humanitarian cooperation as a means of building intercivilizational dialogue, achieving concord and ensuring mutual understanding between peoples" and also about "counter manifestations of neofascism, any forms of racial discrimination, aggressive nationalism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia, attempts to rewrite the history, use it for instigating confrontation and revanchism in the world politics, and revise the outcome of the World War Two" [The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation].

To implement the goals of the "Russian world" project in practice, on the basis of the Order of the President of the Russian Federation dated June 21, 2007, the "Russian world" Foundation was established [Shanhina, 2012, p. 92–93]. Through the prism of its activity, it is possible to clearly trace steps that are difficult to match with the foundation's statutory goals. In particular, along with the financing of projects related to the maintenance of the Russian language and culture in the world, financial support for initiatives dedicated to the World War II, topics related to the "friendship", "unification" of the Slavic peoples is a common phenomenon. Is also worth noting the fact that the central event of the year, which sums up the results of the foundation's work – the "Russian world" Assembly is tied to the above-mentioned "Day of People's Unity" [Masiienko, Zahryvenko, Koval and Tereshchenko, 2022, p. 44–45, 49–50].

The general aspects that characterize the meaning of "Russian world" are well known. At the same time, in search of an answer to the question of what meaning was invested in the "Russian world" project at the beginning of its formation, we consider it necessary to turn to the so-called "Russian doctrine". During 2005 – 2007, the relevant document was exceptionally actively popularized by the Russian Orthodox Church, including personally by the then Patriarch Alexy II and the head of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate Metropolitan Kirill [Vsya khronika, no date]. The juxtaposition of the universally recognized fundamental role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the development and dissemination of the "Russian world" [Kotyhorenko and Rafalskyi, 2013, p. 61–62; Lunkin, 2018, p. 166–167] project, the presence in Russia of "mutually beneficial cooperation" and even a "political alliance" between the church and secular authorities [Hurak and Kobuta, 2021, p. 35, 45], the repetition of many of Ivan Ilyin's ideas in the document, and the use of key provisions of the "Russian doctrine" by the Kremlin leadership provide grounds for assumptions about its special importance for the formation of a new ideological foundation of the Russian Federation.

The document is imbued with messianic approaches to Russia's place in the development of humanity and its special place in world history. The Russian Federation is defined in the doctrine as a continuation of "historical Russia", which includes the Tsardom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, and the Soviet Union [Russkaya doktrina Chast' VI. Puti preobrazovanij, no date]. It criticizes the Communist-Leninists, who, contrary to Joseph Stalin's position, granted Ukrainians and Belarusians sovereignty within the Soviet state. The document also contains the thesis that in this way a "delayed action mine" was laid under the USSR [Russkaya doktrina Chast' III. Russkoe gosudarstvo [1], no date]. The foreign policy goals outlined in the doctrine seem especially interesting to us. According to the approaches of the document's authors, Russia as the "demiurge of harmony" should focus on creating a multipolar world. At the same time, the document emphasizes that by rejecting the "civilized separation" of 1991, Russia is embarking on the path of "the ideology of the return and reunification of those territories of historical Russia to which it has a historical and moral right". In this context, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan were mentioned in the doctrine [Russkaya doktrina Chast' III. Russkoe gosudarstvo [2], no date].

Conclusions. Vladimir Putin's team establishment as the unopposed ruling political force in the Russian Federation at the beginning of the 21st century led to the growth of its geopolitical ambitions. To justify its rights to being on one of the key places among influential international

actors and to secure Russia's "exclusive rights" in the post-Soviet space, the Kremlin leadership needed an ideological base. The reaction to the corresponding request was the introduction of modern imperial ideology. Ivan Ilyin, an uncompromising critic of the Bolsheviks, a supporter of monarchism and fascist ideology, acted as an ideological guide for the Russian ruling elite. Since 2005, the original "state ideas" of the philosopher occupy a key place in the rhetoric of the Russian ruling elite.

A practical manifestation of the new ideological approaches was the introduction of the "Day of People's Unity", associated with the traditions of tsarist Russia, which essentially replaced the celebration of the so called "Great October Socialist Revolution". In the same vein, we can consider the launch of the action called "Saint George's ribbon", which is a kind of attempt to combine the legacy of the Romanovs with the pages of the history of the USSR convenient for the Kremlin. Criticizing the federal nature of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin at the same time actively used the victory of the USSR in World War II for its geopolitical purposes. To the greatest extent, this was manifested due to the active popularization of the myth of the "Great Victory" and the hypertrophied celebration of "Victory Day" − the so-called "Pobedobesie".

One of the important components of the new state ideology of the Russian Federation was the active use of the "besieged fortress" concept, which gradually acquired a clearly expressed anti-American orientation. In contrast to the first presidential term, after the tragic events in Beslan and the Orange Revolution, Vladimir Putin has been increasingly harsh towards the West, primarily official Washington. The rhetoric of the Kremlin leadership became especially sharp after the US initiative to deploy elements of the American anti-missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic acquired real outlines.

Tough declarations of the leadership of Russia at that time were complemented by decisive steps. The use of radioactive substances on the territory of Great Britain to kill a former employee of the FSB, cyber-attacks on the governmental structure of a NATO and EU member − Estonia, a return to the Soviet practice of aviation combat duty, a missile strike on Georgian territory by a Russian aircraft demonstrated the readiness of official Moscow to raise the stakes in the framework of the struggle for the redistribution of geopolitical "chessboard".

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that by gradually intensifying criticism of the USA and resorting to demonstrations of force and provocative steps, the Kremlin leadership left room for maneuver. A good example of this state of affairs is the preservation of close relations between Vladimir Putin and George Bush. The facts show that these relations have not undergone significant changes even after the decision of the White House to place elements of the American anti-missile defense system in Central-Eastern Europe and the "Munich speech" of the Russian president.

In their speeches, both Vladimir Putin and representatives of his team quite often appealed to the ideas of Ivan Ilyin. At the same time, a significant part of them, which has an imperialist, anti-democratic, and pro-fascist orientation, could not be voiced naturally. The Russian authorities needed ideological postulates that objectively had to be positively perceived both in the Russian state and outside its borders. Over a certain period of time, the function of scenery for Russian imperialism and revanchism was entrusted to the ideological project "Russian peace".

During the second presidential term of Vladimir Putin, it was already possible to trace alarming signals that unequivocally demonstrated that behind the "humanitarian" envelope of "Russian world" aggressive foreign policy goals were hidden. In particular, in the framework of the Annual Address to the Federal Assembly in 2007, the second Russian president called the Russian language an element of the "historical brotherhood of peoples", and described the care for it and the growth of the outpouring of Russian culture as an important "political issue". In the following year, "Russian world" was included in the new version of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. In this document, it is mentioned in the context of "establishing an intercivilizational dialogue", "countering manifestations of neo-fascism... revanchism in world politics".

The most openly imperial essence of the Putin regime in its early stages is reflected in the framework of the so-called "Russian doctrine". This document included provisions on the messianic

role of Russia, criticism of the Bolsheviks for the division of the USSR into republics, the postulate on the historical continuity of the Russian Federation from tsarist times, etc. In the context of outlining the foreign policy goals of the Russian Federation, the doctrine refers to the creation of a multipolar world, the non-recognition of the 1991 Belovezh Accords, and the declaration of the path that should lead to the "reunification" of Russia with Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.

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УДК 327

ESTABLISHMENT, CURRENT STATE AND PROSPECTS OF POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND SERBIA

СТВОРЕННЯ, ПОТОЧНИЙ СТАН І ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ ПОЛІТИЧНИХ ВІДНОСИН МІЖ АЗЕРБАЙДЖАНОМ І СЕРБІЄЮ

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Abstract. The article examines the establishment, dynamics and current state of political and diplomatic relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Serbia, development trends and reasons hindering the development of political relations, as well as targeted visits of heads of state and government. It also analyzes in detail the role of organizations engaged in cooperation between the two countries in the political sphere, the activities of the intergovernmental commission, the Inter-Parliamentary Group and other issues.

Key words: Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, Baku, political-diplomatic relations, Kosovo conflict, president, parliament, prime minister, MFA, embassy

Анотація. У статті розглянуто встановлення, динаміку та поточний стан політико-дипломатичних відносин між Азербайджанською Республікою та Республікою Сербія, тенденції розвитку та причини, що перешкоджають розвитку політичних відносин, а також цілеспрямовані візити глав держав та урядів. Тут також детально проаналізовано роль органів, що здійснюють співпрацю між двома країнами в політичній сфері, діяльність міжурядової комісії, міжпарламентської групи та інші питання.

Ключові слова: Азербайджанська Республіка, Республіка Сербія, Белград, Баку, політико-дипломатичні відносини, Косовський конфлікт, президент, парламент, прем'єр-міністр, МЗС, посольство

Introduction. The development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the Republic of Serbia in the political sphere is one of the most important directions of Azerbaijan's foreign policy. The independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan was recognized by the official Belgrade representing the Yugoslav Federation on December 31, 1991, and diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on August 21, 1997 [Azərbaycan Respublikası Xarici İşlər Nazirliyi.Xarici siyasət.İkitərəfli münasibətlər, 1997]. The passage of political relations between the two countries through specific stages of development indicates the presence of important and specific moments of cooperation between the parties. In particular, over the past ten to twelve years, relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Serbia have been developing in all spheres. High-level mutual official visits and documents signed during these visits indicate that Azerbaijan is at the stage of developing cooperation relations with Serbia in the political sphere.

The latest literature review. In recent years, scholars have paid considerable attention the political relations between the two countries. Here we can specify the works of such authors as Askerzade A., İsmayılov M., Bayramov V. and others who have covered this problem.

The purpose of the research is to establish political relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Serbia, to identify their current state and prospects through scientific and political research.

Research results. The position of the Azerbaijani state on the Kosovo issue was one of the factors that seriously affected the political relations between our countries. Speaking about the Kosovo issue, the first thing that comes to mind is the participation of peacekeeping forces. So, in January 1997, a peacekeeping unit was created as part of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. After the ratification of the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Government of the Republic of Turkey in the Azerbaijani Parliament on October 20, 1999 on the status of the Azerbaijani contingent going to Kosovo within the framework of the Kosovo task force, a group of Azerbaijani peacekeeping contingent servicemen began to perform their duties in this direction [Askerzade, 2009, p.6].

Since September 1999, a Turkish battalion of the Azerbaijani peacekeeping platoon (1 officer, 1 sergeant and 32 soldiers) has been operating in Kosovo. The Azerbaijani peacekeeping platoon provided security in the area of Dragash (the settlement of Brod, etc.). At a meeting with Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Abiyev, NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson expressed gratitude for the role of Azerbaijani peacekeepers and stressed "the special position of the Azerbaijani contingent of more than 40,000 peacekeepers in Kosovo" [Askerzade, 2009, p.6].

On February 26, 2008, immediately after the Kosovo Parliament declared independence, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev declared that this decision was illegal, recognized the territorial integrity of Serbia and expressed political will regarding the withdrawal of Azerbaijani peacekeepers from Kosovo. The Milli Majlis made a decision in April 2008, and the Azerbaijani peacekeeping platoon was withdrawn from Kosovo once and for all [Beynəlxalq sülhməramlı əməliyyatlarda iştirak, 2008].

Baku's decision to withdraw its peacekeeping forces from Kosovo has certainly disappointed the Muslim residents of this place. However, residents of the Dragash region, as children of a common Islamic culture, understood Azerbaijan's step in this direction, as well as the non-recognition of Kosovo's independence due to the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia [Kosova'da Karabağ Olayları Az Biliniyor, 2012].

It should be noted that the withdrawal of our peacekeeping forces from Kosovo and the non-recognition of the independence of a region with a common Islamic cultural heritage was a decision that meets the national interests of Azerbaijan, and in this matter the state interests of Serbia and Azerbaijan coincided. This position of our state, of course, had a positive impact on the development of Belgrade-Baku political relations, and soon at the 86th plenary session of the UN General Assembly on March 14, 2008, Serbia defended the legal position of Azerbaijan. Thus, at this plenary meeting, the draft resolution "on the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan" (A/62/L.42) was considered, resolution 62/243 was discussed and adopted. Serbia was among the 39 countries that voted for the resolution during the voting [Резолюции и решения принятые Генеральной Ассамблеей на шестьдесят второй сессии, 2008, p.3].

Until 2010, meetings of state and government officials coincided only at international events, meetings of regional and international organizations. For example, during Serbia's chairmanship in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization in 2006-2007 [Почео састанак Савета министара спољних послова БСЕЦ, 2008], Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mammadyarov visited Belgrade, and in 2003, 2004, 2009, when our country chaired the NOD [Azərbaycan - Qara Dəniz İqtisadi Əməkdaşlıq Təşkilatı (QDİƏT) münasibətləri, 2009], the Serbian Foreign Minister visited Baku [Məmmədli, 2014]. October 10-12, 2007 Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources H. Bagirov at the 6th Belgrade Conference of European Environment Ministers [Azərbaycan Respublikasının Serbiya Respublikasındakı səfirliyi], on December 5, 2008, Justice Minister F. Mammadov in Belgrade, with the support of the OSCE, took part in an international conference on the topic of teaching the judiciary [Məhkəmə islahatı üzrə Azərbaycanın təcrübəsi böyük maraq doğurur].

The Ministers of Azerbaijan and Serbia, who took part in international events, also held a bilateral meeting during the visit and exchanged views on the creation of a regulatory framework for cooperation and the development of ties between our countries.

On May 11-13, 2010, Serbian President Boris Tadic arrived in Azerbaijan on an official visit and resumed bilateral political relations between Baku and Belgrade, entering an important stage when mutual visits of high-level government officials became intensive [Azərbaycan Respublikası Xarici İşlər Nazirliyi.Xarici siyasət].

At the meeting of the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Serbia in an expanded format, the sides exchanged views on political, economic, humanitarian, cultural, judicial, legal and other issues related to bilateral, as well as regional and multilateral cooperation. President Ilham Aliyev stressed that relations between our countries have reached a new level, Serbia is regarded as a strategic partner, and strong bilateral relations serve and open up opportunities for expanding regional cooperation between the Balkan and Caucasian regions. In turn, President Boris Tadic announced Serbia's intention to develop relations with Azerbaijan as true friends. The Presidents also noted that our countries have common interests in preserving territorial integrity [Azərbaycan və Serbiya Prezidentlərinin geniş tərkibdə görüşü olmuşdur, 2010].

After the meeting, the presidents signed a "Joint statement", "Protocol on cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia", "Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Government of the Republic of Serbia on trade and economic cooperation", The "Convention between the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Government of the Republic of Serbia on the abolition of double taxation with respect to taxes on income and property" and other intergovernmental agreements [Azərbaycan Respublikası Xarici İşlər Nazirliyi.Xarici siyasət] serve the purpose of establishing long-term strategic relations between the parties and strengthening cooperation based on the principles of friendship.

The joint statement of the Presidents determined further prospects for the development of cooperation in all spheres of relations between the two countries: international organizations (UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, etc.) took part in it, deepening cooperation within the framework of international cooperation, the need for close cooperation in combating all forms of international crime, investing in the economy and the importance of obtaining benefits from energy projects, this also affected the position of the parties, which clearly focused on territorial integrity and other issues [Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin və Serbiya Respublikası Prezidentinin Birgə Bəyanatı].

The protocol on cooperation signed during the visit between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs refers to the development of bilateral relations in the political, economic, scientific, technical, cultural and consular spheres, the promotion of intensive dialogue and cooperation within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, dialogue on visa regimes and simplification of visa procedures, the Diplomatic Academy The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia and "Kosa Popovich" provided for the exchange of experience, lecturers and participants between the Diplomatic Academy, etc. [İsmayılov, 2018, p.286].

In general, the results of the first official visit of the President of Serbia at a high level were positive and significant in terms of the development of bilateral relations.

An event regarded as an important step in relations – the opening of the Azerbaijani Embassy in Belgrade in March 2010 and the Serbian Embassy in Baku in May 2011 [Azerbaijan-Serbia relations, 2020] opened up new opportunities in the development of bilateral diplomatic and political relations.

On May 26, 2011, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, in an interview with the newly appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Serbia to our country Zoran Vajovic, noted the importance of mutual visits at a high level in the development of bilateral relations, noted that the visit of President Boris Tadic in May last year was very successful and productive, and noted that he stressed the presence of a large the potential for expanding cooperation between our countries in various fields [Azerbaijan-Serbia relations, 2020].

It should be noted that embassies have played an important role in the development of relations. Ambassador of the Republic of Azerbaijan to Belgrade Eldar Hasanov, carrying out active work in this direction, constantly kept in touch with the leaders and representatives of state and

government bodies, the Parliament of Serbia, tried to keep in the spotlight and develop the current state of political, economic, humanitarian and inter-parliamentary relations between the two countries.

One of the main activities of the Embassy is to bring objective information about the Karabakh issue to the Serbian public, to achieve parliamentary recognition of the Khojaly genocide. Despite the fact that the Khojaly genocide has not been recognized in the Serbian Parliament, this issue has become public knowledge and the subject of discussion in the press.

The state visit of President Ilham Aliyev to Serbia on June 8-9, 2011 gave an impetus to the expansion of cooperation and brought a new content to the relations – the content of strategic partnership. At the one–on-one and expanded meeting of the heads of state, it was stressed that cooperation between our countries is successfully developing in political, economic, cultural, humanitarian, scientific, educational and other spheres, and high-level bilateral visits contribute to deepening relations [Əliyev İ., 2017, p.142]. President Boris Tadic called Azerbaijan an important partner of Serbia, noted the importance of strengthening political, economic, cultural and humanitarian ties between the parties. Stressing the high level of political ties, President Ilham Aliyev expressed confidence that Azerbaijani–Serbian relations will develop rapidly. The Presidents emphasized that they support the territorial integrity of our countries [Əliyev İ., 2017, p. 143; 32].

After the meeting, our countries signed 12 agreements on cooperation in the field of emergencies, economics, science, education, energy, civil aviation, culture, sports, tourism and other spheres [Əliyev İ., 2017, pp.144-146].

Making a statement at a press conference after the signing of the documents, President Boris Tadic expressed his agreement with the political relations that have risen to a strategic level and stated that he would constantly protect the territorial integrity of our country, commented on the main content of the signed agreements, touched upon areas of cooperation in energy and other sectors of the economy,

He thanked Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for the financial assistance allocated in connection with the construction of cultural centers in Belgrade, and noted that they also discussed issues of cooperation in the field of health and defense [Əliyev İ., 2017, pp.147-149].

President Ilham Aliyev, making a statement, noted that our multifaceted relations are based on strong political ties, that there are tolerant and multicultural traditions in Serbia and Azerbaijan, stressed the importance of combining efforts in these areas [Azərbaycan və Serbiya prezidentləri mətbuata bəyanatlarla çıxış etmişlər].

During his visit to Serbia, President Ilham Aliyev also held meetings with the President of the National Assembly, Mrs. Slavica Djukic-Dejanovic and other officials who played an important role in the development of a wide range of relations between the two countries. Chairman of the Serbian Parliament – National Assembly Slavica Djukic-Dejanovic at a meeting with President Ilham Aliyev said that she considers Azerbaijan a strategic partner, attaches great importance to cooperation in various fields and international organizations, that it is necessary to develop cooperation in the field of inter-parliamentary relations [Əliyev İ., 2017, p. 154].

During the visit, President Ilham Aliyev took part in the opening of Tashmaidan Park in Belgrade and the monument to national leader Heydar Aliyev installed here [Azərbaycan Prezidenti İlham Əliyev Belqradda Taşmaydan parkının açılış mərasimində iştirak etmişdir, 2011], the Azerbaijani Embassy in Serbia and the bust of the brilliant composer Uzeyir Hajibeyli in Novi Sad [Serbiyanın Novi Sad şəhərində Üzeyir Hacıbəylinin büstü açılmışdır. "Azərbaycan" qəz, 2011]. The monument in Tashmaidan Park was visited. In the speeches delivered at both inaugural events, it was emphasized that relations between the two states are built on the basis of strategic partnership, relations will be strengthened in all directions in a bilateral and multilateral format [Azərbaycan Prezidenti İlham Əliyev Belqradda Taşmaydan parkının açılış mərasimində iştirak etmişdir, 2011].

After the visit of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev to Serbia, relations between the two countries became even more strained, and numerous exchanges of visits were

carried out. Among them the visits of Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic as Co-Chairman of the intergovernmental commission (August 31, 2011 - September 01), Minister of Labor and Social Policy Rasim Ljajic and Minister of Agriculture, Trade, Forestry and Water Management Petrovic (January 24-25, 2012), Minister of Economy and Regional Development Nebojsa Chiric (February 2, 2012), Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk Jeremic (January 24-25, 2012) to participate in International Conference organized on March 14-15, 2012) and a delegation led by Deputy Chairman of the Milli Majlis AR Bahar Muradova to participate in the 20th session of the OSCE PA in Belgrade (2011, 06 – July 10), mutual visits of Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov (October 11, 2012) to participate in the anniversary event dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the Non-Aligned Movement, in particular, on February 7-9, 2013, the official visit of President Tomislav Nikolic to Azerbaijan occupy an important place.

Ilham Aliyev, who stressed the successful development of Azerbaijani-Serbian cooperation at the meeting with the Serbian Foreign Minister, positively assessed the high level of political ties between our countries and noted good prospects for bilateral ties. The Serbian Foreign Minister expressed solidarity with the President of Azerbaijan [Əliyev İ., 2017, p.174].

And the official visit of Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic to the Republic of Azerbaijan in February 2013 was an indicator of the high level of political ties between the two countries and opened up new opportunities for the development of relations.

At the one-on-one and expanded meeting of the presidents, the current state of individual spheres of relations within bilateral and international organizations was discussed, satisfaction was expressed with the effective development of bilateral relations, it was shown that there are broad prospects for cooperation in the fields of economy, energy, transport, investment, etc. The idea of President Tomislav Nikolic that our country should become a very reliable partner for Serbia was approved by the head of our state.

Several documents were signed during the visit. The most important political outcome of the high-level visit was the signing of the "declaration on friendly relations and strategic partnership" between our countries. The declaration supported the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Serbia, expressed the importance of resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani and Kosovo conflicts in accordance with international law, cooperation in combating international terrorism, organized crime, arms and drug smuggling and human trafficking, preservation of cultural and historical values and other areas [Azərbaycan Respublikası və Serbiya Respublikası arasında dostluq münasibətləri və strateji tərəfdaşlıq haqqında Bəyannamə].

Then, in a statement by President Ilham Aliyev to the press, he reported on the successful development of relations between our countries, spoke in detail about the signed agreements and, in particular, about the provisions of the declaration and expressed confidence that after this visit, the relations of friendship and partnership between the two countries will reach a new level: "We will continue to cooperate successfully as friends and partners" [Əliyev İ., 2018, pp.24-25].

Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic, commenting on every word of President Ilham Aliyev about the indissoluble Azerbaijani-Serbian friendship, noted that in just a few years an intensive political dialogue at a high level has developed between our countries, official visits of heads of state have taken place, serious results have been achieved in bilateral and multilateral cooperation, our countries have become strategic partners, the Azerbaijani-Serbian friendship is an excellent example of mutual understanding and the establishment of friendly relations between peoples of different faiths [Əliyev İ., 2018, .25-26].

During the visit, President Tomislav Nikolic took part in the unveiling of the monument to Serbian scientist Nikola Tesla in the center of Baku.

Thus, the agreements signed during the visit, useful exchanges of views and statements by the heads of state brought the two countries even closer, opening up new opportunities for the development of friendly relations and interaction between the parties.

On April 13-15, 2015, Prime Minister Alexander Vucic and a delegation paid an official visit to Azerbaijan to participate in a meeting of the Joint Intergovernmental Commission. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev received the delegation. The sides exchanged views on the current state

and prospects of cooperation in such areas as energy, infrastructure, investments, cargo transportation, cultural, humanitarian, territorial integrity of our countries. During the discussions, we see a coincidence of the positions of the parties [İlham Əliyev Serbiya Baş nazirinin rəhbərlik etdiyi nümayəndə heyətini qəbul edib, 2015].

9 days after this meeting of the intergovernmental commission, on April 24, President Tomislav Nikolic visited the Republic of Armenia at a memorial service on the occasion of the centenary of the "fictitious Armenian Genocide". This step by Serbia, which chaired the OSCE in 2015, naturally did not meet with satisfaction among the Azerbaijani public. At the same time, this step showed that Serbia, despite its strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, maintains close relations with Armenia and pursues a balanced policy in the South Caucasus.

The political analysis of the relations shows that the heads of state, in particular Ilham Aliyev, played an exceptional role in the development of Azerbaijani-Serbian relations. In this sense, for his contribution to the development of friendship and cooperation between the two countries, Azerbaijani Head of State Ilham Aliyev was awarded the highest Order of Serbia.

The logical conclusion of the development of Azerbaijani-Serbian political-diplomatic, bilateral and geopolitical relations along a dynamic and ascending line was the official visit to our country on May 21-22, 2018 by the President of the Republic of Serbia Alexander Vucic. During the meeting of Ilham Aliyev and Alexander Vucic in an expanded format, an exchange of views on bilateral relations, regional and international issues took place, the presidents demonstrated the political will for more active cooperation. Alexander Vucic also congratulated Ilham Aliyev on his election as president and on the 100th anniversary of the ADR [Əliyev İ., 2019, pp. 66-67].

After the meeting, agreements and memoranda were signed on healthcare, justice, quarantine and plant protection, international road and air transportation, "joint action plan for strategic partnership", the presidents made statements to the press. In his speech, President Ilham Aliyev said that the agreements and memoranda concluded will open up new opportunities for deepening relations, and the joint action plan for strategic partnership is an important and very important document that reflects all the important issues related to further cooperation. The Heads of State stated that the current state of trade turnover is unsatisfactory and that the exchange of views and cooperation to increase its volume will bring a positive result, considering this high-level meeting as another great success of Azerbaijani-Serbian political relations [Əliyev İ., 2019, pp.71-76].

Regular consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs occupy an important place in the development of political relations between our countries. The Azerbaijani-Serbian Foreign Ministry held another political consultation in June 2019 in Belgrade with the participation of Deputy Ministers (R.Hasanov and Z.Vuyich), held among the delegations under the chairmanship. Consultations attract attention, covering almost all areas of relations.

The factor of the delivery of a large batch of mortar shells of various calibers from Serbia to Armenia during the Tovuz battles on July 12-14, 2020 had a negative impact on Azerbaijani-Serbian relations, military-economic relations. As you know, a few days before the start of hostilities, a large batch of mortar shells of various calibers was delivered from Serbia to Armenia.

On August 7, President Aleksandar Vucic called President Ilham Aliyev to express regret over the incident and send a high-ranking delegation to investigate the situation, highly appreciated the strategic partnership relations between our countries and invited his colleague to make an official visit to Serbia. President Ilham Aliyev welcomed his colleague's decision to send a high-ranking Serbian delegation to investigate and discuss [Serbiya Respublikasının Prezidenti Aleksandr Vuçiç İlham Əliyevə telefonla zəng edib, 2020]. An important role in overcoming the problem was played by the agreement of the Presidents on the inadmissibility of actions in the future that negatively affect the interstate strategic partnership.

On July 25, 2021, President Ilham Aliyev received a delegation headed by Serbian Foreign Minister Nikola Selakovic. The meeting discussed important areas of strategic partnership relations between the two countries, the role of the next meeting of the intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation in deepening economic cooperation, the participation of Serbian companies

in the restoration and reconstruction of our lands liberated from occupation against the background of the restoration of the territorial integrity of our countries.

Then, at the meeting of the Serbian Minister with his Azerbaijani counterpart, an exchange of views took place on further intensification of cooperation in bilateral and multilateral formats, issues of economic cooperation, visa liberalization and the creation of direct flights between Belgrade and Baku, preparations for the 60th anniversary of the Non-Aligned Movement were discussed. The Minister noted that Serbia attaches special importance to the strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, and expressed confidence that the high-level dialogue will be strengthened in the coming period. On this occasion, Selakovich invited Minister Bayramov to pay an official visit to Serbia. In addition, the head of Serbian diplomacy agreed with his Azerbaijani counterpart to hold bilateral political consultations between the two ministries, especially in the field of consular work. At the meeting, it was emphasized that both countries are committed to observing the principles of international law, as well as mutually support the preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty .

On November 23, 2022, within the framework of the state visit of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev to Serbia, the heads of state signed the "Joint Statement between the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the President of the Republic of Serbia", "Memorandum on the establishment of the Strategic Partnership Council between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Serbia" and the annex to it "Regulations of the Strategic Partnership Council between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Serbia". Thus, the political relations between the two states have moved to a qualitatively higher level - the level of strategic partnership and alliance.

Conclusions. Thus, official diplomatic, political, economic and other relations between Azerbaijan and Serbia developed in the form of multilateral cooperation within the framework of the UN and international organizations until 2010. The visits of the heads of state have become the highest form of bilateral cooperation. The political will of the heads of state played an important role in the regulation, development and transition of political relations between our countries to the level of strategic partnership. Studies show that along with heads of state, heads of government, chairmen of parliaments, foreign ministers and chairmen of relevant committees, the Azerbaijani-Serbian Interparliamentary Friendship Group, as well as the ambassadors of both countries were an important component of the implementation of political ties. Thus, the parties attach great importance to political cooperation at the level of strategic partnership and alliance, which creates confidence in the prospects for the development of political relations.

As a result of the establishment of a close political dialogue and high-level partnership between Serbia and Montenegro, where cold relations on the Kosovo issue still remain, Azerbaijan has strengthened the geopolitical, political and economic positions of our state in the Balkan region, characterized by a complex ethno-political configuration.

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СУЧАСНА СИСТЕМА МІЖНАРОДНОГО ПРАВА

GENOCIDE IN THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME AND FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE CRIME

ГЕНОЦИД В ІСТОРІЇ МІЖНАРОДНОГО ПРАВА: ЗЛОЧИН ТА СТАНОВЛЕННЯ КОНЦЕПЦІЇ ЗЛОЧИНУ

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Abstract. *Although the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted in 1948, the acts of genocide were known to humankind long before that. Throughout the history, attitudes to mass killings of people in the theory of international law and legal consciousness have been changed. Although these crimes have been known for a long history of international law, the concept of punishment for them has not been shaped uniformly during different epochs. The 19th and early 20th centuries were the period of active development of the idea of genocide as an international crime, however it was finally formed with the adoption of the mentioned Convention.*

Key words: *genocide, the crime of genocide, human rights, criminal responsibility in international law, history of international legal responsibility*

Анотація. *Конвенція «Про попередження злочину геноциду та покарання за нього» була прийнята 1948 р., проте самі діяння, що складають злочин геноциду згідно з нею, були відомі людству задовго до цього. Протягом історії ставлення до масових знищень людей в теорії міжнародного права та правосвідомості народів змінювалось. І хоча самі такі злочини були відомі протягом тривалої історії міжнародного права, концепція покарання за них формувалась не рівномірно у різних народів та епох. Періодом активного розвитку концепції злочину геноциду є XIX та початок XX ст., а її кінцевим оформленням стало прийняття згаданої Конвенції.*

Ключові слова*: геноцид, злочин геноциду, права людини, кримінальна відповідальність у міжнародному праві, історія міжнародно-правової відповідальності*

Genocide is a phenomenon, that has been known to mankind almost throughout its history. However, it was enshrined as a crime, and as the most serious international crime ("the crime of crimes") only after World War II. The main impetus for this was the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948. The "last straw" which made international community to adopt the aforementioned Convention were the mass crimes against civilian population committed by the Soviet and Nazi regimes in the 1930s and 1940s.

The main ideologist of the concept of genocide as an international crime was Rafal Lemkin. Moreover, on the basis of his concept the relevant Convention was later developed [Lemkin, 1944].

Due to R. Lemkin, the concept of genocide as an international crime was finally established in international law. Manifestations of extermination (sometimes complete extermination) of the population have been known in the history before. However, it was Rafal Lemkin who finally proved that genocide can be prevented as a "crime of crimes" only by legally distinguishing it from other crimes, including serious ones (such as war crimes and crimes against humanity), and by establishing the highest degree of responsibility for its committing.

Main Lemkin's argumentation in his concept of genocide was the evidence of the two most telling examples of physical extermination of the nations – the Holodomor and the Holocaust – crimes committed by the Soviet and Nazi regimes against two most close to Lemkin peoples [Lemkin, 1953].

The adoption of the Convention coincided with the rapid development of the international human rights protection. From that time, international legal support for the human rights and a set of measures to prevent their violation began to function in the system. In fact, the beginning of the idea of homocentricity of international law and the formation of its two key branches - international human rights law and international criminal law - was laid.

Whereas R. Lemkin's ideas formed the basis for the future field of international criminal law, another native of Lviv region, Hersh Lauterpacht, made a special contribution to the development of international law for the protection of human rights. Professor Lauterpacht's contribution to the development of a modern system of international human rights protection is one of the most significant. Especially this is true about his concept of individual rights and international mechanism of their protection. Even the date of the publication of H. Lauterpacht's program work "International Law and Human Rights" (1950) [Lauterpacht, 1950], which substantiates the international legal personality of the individual and which underpins modern concepts of international human rights law, has become symbolic. 1950 can be considered as the "year of birth" of the international legal personality of individual in modern international law (historically in previous periods the individual was already considered a subject of international law, but his international legal personality was rejected and was not recognized in the classical era of positivist international law).

That was the year when all three components of the individual's international legal personality were finally formed: in 1946, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals for the first time in history formulated the principles of international responsibility of individuals; in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which adoption was inspirited inter alia by H. Lauterpacht) recognized the international human capacity at the universal level (although even before that the individual enjoyed some rights under international law), and in 1950 the European Convention on human rights (which was also influenced by Lauterpacht's ideas) provided the individual with an international capacity to act – the possibility to apply for and defend ones rights in the European Court of Human Rights.

Also H. Lauterpacht was among the first who noticed the tendency towards homo-centricity of international law and revealed the essence of this law as a law of international society. Already in his textbook on international law, Lauterpacht provided an expanded and concise definition of international law; the latter is laid down as: "the law of the international community" (this definition opens the first volume of the textbook) [Lauterpacht, 1970].

The recognition of an individual as a subject of international law, in particular, contributed to the establishment of international criminal responsibility for persons who commit international crimes. It became a significant contribution to the development of international criminal law.

Further it will be considered on some examples how the law of nations responded throughout history to the phenomenon that today is called "genocide". The process of formation of the concept of the crime of genocide in the 20th century will also be considered.

On the concept of crime in international law and international legal responsibility

The most severe responsibility in international law, as in municipal one, comes for the gravest crimes aimed at undermining the foundations of society (in this case – international community). According to P.-M. Dupuy, each historical epoch, reflects the concept of responsibility that is more in line with the specific existing legal relationships and the social environment in which they occurred. Rudolf von Jhering considered that each state punishes most severely for those crimes that threaten its fundamental principles. Although he said that about the institute of responsibility in domestic law, this is also true of international law.

The institute of international responsibility has been quite controversial throughout the history of this law, and even today, according to some scholars, it is just emerging.

For a long time in the doctrine, the basis and main expression of international legal responsibility was the obligation of the state to repay damage caused by its unlawful act or international crime.

Up to the classical period of international legal science, the main basis for international legal responsibility was negative action against a foreigner or foreigners.

Manifestations of crimes against humanity in the ancient period and the attitude towards them

In the history of international law since its appearance, in the ancient and medieval periods one can see examples of acts that are today interpreted as genocide.

In the region of the ancient Near East and Asia Minor (Mesopotamia, Hittite Kingdom, Egypt, Ugarit, Marie, etc.), there were rather few restrictions on the means of warfare. Some restrictions were dictated not by considerations of humanity but by economic expediency. In the Hittite law of war, there was an institution of "conquest at the scene of conflict", which consisted in the peaceful transition of the territory surrounded by Hittites under their jurisdiction. This prevented the destruction of cities and the economy and the population as a potential labourforce. Assyria and the country of Marie actively used the practice of economic blockade - as an alternative for hostilities [Grayson, 1987]. However, these examples confirm only the unwillingness of the conquerors to destroy economically profitable lands.

Both the cause and the consequence of the crimes under consideration spread from the very nature of international responsibility in the ancient period, which had a collective character.

The reason for the collective nature of responsibility was that a person in primitive society was considered an integral part of this society (tribe, clan, family, chiefdom, pre-state entity, etc.). In the international sphere, the possibility of collective punishment was very important for international law. The whole population could have been killed with their head if the latter had committed a serious wrongdoing.

In India, according to the Laws of Manu, there was a community responsibility for a crime committed within its territory if the offender remained unknown [Bühler, 2018]. The same rule applied in the countries of Asia Minor, where, in the event of the attack of bandits or pirates on a trade delegation or caravan or embassy of another state, the whole state in whose territory the attack took place has been responsible.

Military reprisals became a special type of international responsibility. They were originated from the principle of collective responsibility. They can be described as the responsibility imposed on the whole nation, the country, for wrongful acts or violations of its international obligations by its ruler – the subject of international law. The notion of military reprisals is closely related to and based on the doctrine of "just war".

Although the category of responsibility for war crimes did not exist in the ancient period, there were provisions for the regulation of warfare. Thus, responsibility for exceeding the rules established by a treaty or custom of warfare occurred as a liability for breach of a treaty or custom.

Responsibility for international offenses by individuals of another state or its officials should be noted separately. In particular, such responsibility was envisaged in mutual assistance treaties and military alliances. They generally stated that foreign military officials or military contingent members in the territory of a foreign state (staying there under the treaty provisions) should comply with the order and rules of the host country. In the case of committing a crime against the local population, the same treaties envisaged their responsibility.

Ancient Assyrian laws of war differed the concept of the conquering war and the punitive campaign (the status of the enemy and the attitude to the civilian population was appropriate). The first campaigns were for the territories that Assyria conquered for the first time and which had the status of hostile countries, they were subject to ordinary military conquest by war. The punitive campaigns of Assyria differed in inhumane treatment of enemies and prisoners of war: the torture was applied to the captives, the civilian population was massively taken into slavery, there were cases of mockery of the bodies of the dead. Most often, such actions were carried out against the provinces of Assyria, which resorted to disobedience in breach of their obligations to Assyria. Such campaigns had a character of punishment [Grayson, 1987].

A similar difference in the legal characteristic of the wars of ancient Egypt is found in the descriptions of the military campaigns of the Pharaohs: "When his majesty imposed a punishment on the Asians-from-the sands, his majesty gathered many thousands of armies from all over Upper Egypt" (Asian Campaign of Pepi the I); "His Majesty surrounded everyone who rebelled against him and killed them" (Amenhotep II Asian Campaign) [Ancient Near Eastern Texts, 1955].

However, in the ancient period, there were many conflicting facts regarding the attitude to the hostile population during the war. In many cases the formation of own army from among the conquered population were frequent. This fact cannot indicate a potentially negative attitude towards them. Having conquered Samaria, Assyrian king Sargon II deported 27,000 inhabitants, "having created a contingent of 50 chariots and retaining their former social status for the inhabitants." [Ancient Near Eastern Texts, 1955].

The conquests of the Assyrians were often accompanied by mass deportations of the conquered population, assimilating it and accessing its own population. Thus, the Israelites were deported from Samaria to Mesopotamia, Jews from Judea to Babylon, etc. The policy on the deportation of peoples began around the 12th century BC, it was actively continued by the Assyrian emperors of the 8th - 6th centuries BC. Hostilities were carried out both against foreign armies and against the civilian population. In many ways, violent, inhumane acts against the foreign population were dictated by the concept that the conquest brought in the territory of other countries more perfect rule of law, which required an obligation to the gods. In doctrine this phenomenon, even, was called "theology of conquest" [Kemp, 1978].

In ancient doctrine, a negative attitude to mass killings is already emerging. The general doctrinal views of war in ancient China provided with the idea of limiting the means of warfare, humanizing it, and even, if possible, abandoning the military resolution of international disputes. Lao Tzu insisted on this, according to the theory that "a person who owns and uses the Tao is not in a military state and does not use military force to solve problems, either inside or outside his kingdom" [The Ancient Classics Collection, 2015].

Examples of mass killings and the formation of attitudes toward them in medieval doctrine

In the Middle Ages, the Han emperors deported the Xiong tribe to the inland regions of China, and in their place relocated the Huangyi and Xiang tribes, carrying out other people's movements in order to neutralize the nomadic periphery that was dangerous to the center.

It is worth mentioning the fact of medieval history, which researchers (often exaggerating) call "the first international criminal tribunal" or the first court for crimes against humanity. That is the case of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474. This tribunal was convened under the auspices of the Holy Roman Empire against the governor (head of the Burgundian authorities) of the Austrian city of Breisach P. von Hagenbach. The latter was accused of committing massacres during his governorship, effectively creating a "regime of terror" in subordinate territory. Hagenbach was sentenced to death. Although in its pure form this court cannot be characterized as an international tribunal, and the term "crimes against humanity" cannot be transferred to the medieval times (but in fact criminal acts consisted in the destruction of civilians), this fact was clearly of precedent [Gordon, 2013].

Human life was protected by the medieval concept of just war. Due to Francisco Vittoria: "if a war is justly launched, it cannot be conducted in such a way that it destroys the people against whom it is directed: it should be waged only to restore violated rights or protect ones country; and so that, as a result of this war, peace and general security may be established over time". In another work, F. Vittoria considers it quite legitimate to kill a civilian population for the offenses of its ruler (military reprisals as a type of collective responsibility): "The state as a whole can be rightfully punished for the sin of a monarch. If any ruler launches an unjust war against the other, the offended party can plunder, rightfully fight and destroy all subjects of the offending king, even if they themselves are not guilty" [Vittoria, 1964].

Hugo Grotius was one of the first scholars who begin to deny the possibility of collective responsibility, considering it the fiction that the whole nation could be responsible for the crime or offense of one or several individuals [Grotius, 1925].

Formation of the concept of responsibility for crimes against humanity

The aftermath of the World War II and the events that followed it (the San Francisco Conference and the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, the condemnation of Nazi criminals at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals in 1946) resulted in the formation of several institutions of international law and the consolidation of its imperative principles.

The influence of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals on the development of international law, which can be compared with the most significant events in the history of this law, manifested itself in several following ways:

(1) For the first time in the history of this law, an international court has been created to investigate war crimes. All previous attempts of the international community to condemn the perpetrators and all those who had committed the gravest crimes against civilians and war crimes proved futile (that was caused by the concept of state sovereignty, where the person is subject exclusively to the judicial jurisdiction of the state concerned).

(2) The concept of international crimes, which are the gravest crimes against human beings, was formulated. Responsibility for such crimes is determined solely by international law, as well as the mechanism of conviction and punishment for them.

(3) A precedent has been created whereby every person who commits an international crime should be subject to international jurisdiction and to be punished in accordance with international law. Including with the top officials and heads of states.

(4) The tribunals have promoted the value of respect for the human person, its life, liberty and dignity, as well as the idea of direct international legal protection of human rights. The basis of human-centrism in international justice was laid, which at this stage would be determined by the value of human rights.

This is how the concept of international crimes was developed, with international legal responsibility being imposed on anyone who committed them. At the Nuremberg Tribunal, international crimes were referred to: crimes against peace (planning, preparation, initiation or waging of an aggressive war), war crimes (enshrined in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907), and crimes against humanity (such as genocide), and also conspiracy to commit such crimes. These categories of crimes were classified as the gravest in international law.

This fact reinforces the idea of international humanitarian intervention, as a responsibility of the world community to intervene to protect human rights that are violated, even by a legally elected government. However, according to the International Court of Justice, the institute of humanitarian intervention is legitimate only after the appropriate sanction for such action by the UN Security Council.

Given the experience of the tribunals and on the basis of the Nuremberg Principles, a number of codifications of international law were created (in particular, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide). The damage caused by World War II, primarily in the form of civilian casualties, influenced the active formation in the post-war period of the field of international human rights protection, institutions for the prevention of mass violations of human rights. Thus, international legal responsibility for the crime of genocide was enshrined, and in 1948 the Convention was adopted.

Another feature of international law of the twentieth century is that there was a significant expansion of the range of relations that have become subject to international legal regulation.

The most important aspects of international legal regulation in the second half of the twentieth century, most of which have been expressed in the relevant imperative principles of international law, include, in particular:

• Adoption of the principle of human rights protection (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 1966, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950).

• Prohibition of genocide, apartheid, and other crimes against humanity (the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1963, the UN International Convention on the Suppression of the Crime of Apartheid 1976).

• Demand for a peaceful settlement of international disputes and prohibition of the planning and waging of an aggressive war.

• Prohibition of weapons of mass destruction (1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, etc.).

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LEGAL JUSTIFICATION OF FREE WILL AS AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT

ПРАВОВЕ ОБГРУНТУВАННЯ СВОБОДИ ВОЛІ ЯК АБСОЛЮТНОГО ПРАВА

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Abstract: *The article provides a legal justification for the absoluteness of free will. The understanding of free will has changed from imagining it as "fatum" in determinism to defining its limitations through international and national legal norms. Suppose the ancient philosophers wrote that God influences a person's will today. In that case, it is considered relevant to understand the limits of free will through the prism of regulatory and legal regulation. This thesis raises the pressing question of whether free will is absolute.*

The purpose of this article is the legal justification that free will is absolute. To substantiate this thesis, the author proposes to investigate two statements: 1. freedom of will is absolute, and legal norms specify it; 2. freedom of will is not absolute because regulations define its limits. The author examines absolute rights through the prism of their control in international treaties. In particular, an analysis of the normative consolidation and limitation of absolute rights in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was carried out. The author analyses the legal grounds for limiting absolute rights. The scientist concludes that the definition of a specific right as absolute is more connected not with the prohibition to limit it but with its significant meaning. It instead characterises absolute rights as natural and inalienable, although not all absolute rights are. The author claims that free will can be considered an absolute right from which other rights arise. The researcher cites an analogy when the absolute right to life gives rise to the right to health care, which gives rise to a whole series of patient rights. As a result, the author emphasises the possibility of assuming that free will is one of the absolute rights from which all others derive. At the same time, it is noted that the possibility of defining freedom of will as a personal non-property right or a principle of law requires a separate study.

Keywords: *freedom of will, the autonomy of will, absolute rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, exclusive rights.*

Анотація: *У статті проведено правове обґрунтування абсолютності свободи волі. Розуміння свободи волі змінилося від уявлення її як «фатуму» у детермінізмі, до визначення її обмежень через міжнародні та національні правові норми. Якщо античні філософи писали, що саме Бог впливає на волю людини, то сьогодні актуальним вбачається розуміння меж свободи волі крізь призму нормативно-правового регулювання. Це породжує актуальне питання, чи є свобода волі абсолютною. Метою даної статті є правове обґрунтування, що свобода волі носить абсолютний характер. Для обґрунтування даної тези автор пропонує дослідити два твердження: 1. свобода волі є абсолютною, а правові норми уточнюють її; 2.*

свобода волі не є абсолютною, адже її межі визначені нормативно. Автор досліджує абсолютні права крізь призму їх рулювання у міжнародних договорах. Зокрема, проведено аналіз нормативного закріплення та обмеження абсолютних прав у Міжнародному пакті про громадянські та політичні права, Конвенції про захист прав людини та основоположних свобод, Канадській хартії прав і свобод. Автор проводить аналіз правових підстав для обмеження абсолютних прав. Науковець приходить до висновку, що визначення конкретного права як абсолютного більше пов'язано не з забороною його обмежувати, а з його особливо важливим значенням. Це більше характеризує абсолютні права як природні та невід'ємні, хоча і не всі абсолютні права є такими. Автор стверджує, що свобода волі може вважтися абсолютним правом, з якого виходять інші права. Дослідник наводить аналогію, коли з абсолютного права на життя виходить право на охорону здоров'я, яке породжує цілу низку прав пацієнта. В результаті автор наголошує на можливості припустити, що свобода волі є одним з абсолютних прав, з якого походять всі інші. В той же час зазначається, що потребує окремого дослідження можливість визначення свободи волі як особистого немайнового права або принципу права.

Ключові слова: *свобода волі, автономія волі, абсолютні права, Міжнародний пакт про громадянські та політичні права, виключні праві.*

Problem statement. The law must constantly evolve as the primary mechanism for regulating social relations. This is because legal relations are dynamic, continuously complicated, and developing. Therefore, there is no doubt that to regulate these relations adequately, the law must be improved, and the paradigms changed. This also applies to such fundamental concepts as freedom of will.

Statement of the research task. Understanding free will has undergone a long evolutionary path from ancient times to today, absorbing the ideas of ancient philosophers, medieval theologians, European mystics, and modern jurists. The understanding of free will has changed from imagining it as "fatum" in determinism to defining its limitations through legal norms. Suppose the ancient philosophers wrote that God influences a person's will today. In that case, it is considered relevant to understand the limits of free will through the prism of regulatory and legal regulation. All this raises the fundamental question of whether free will is absolute. The purpose of this article is the legal justification that free will is absolute. However, to substantiate this thesis, it is necessary to examine two statements: 1. Freedom of will is absolutely, and legal norms specify it; 2. Freedom of will is not absolute because regulations define its limits.

The aim of the study. To establish the legal justification of freedom of will as an absolute right.

The analysis of recent research and publications. The issue of free will is still not presented in the legal doctrine in the context of absolute rights. However, particular issues of freedom of will and will expression were paid attention to by R.V. Alexiy, S.V. Antonov, M.O. Barinov, O.V. Basai, O.E. Bobrov, M.I. Braginskyi, I.V. Venediktova, V.O. Galai, Z.S. Gladun, A.I. Gromov, O.Yu. Kabalkin, Yu.Kh. Kalmykov, O.Yu. Kashintseva, V.V. Kvanina, V.I. Kisil, O.V. Leontiev, G.Ya. Lopatyenkov, R.A. Maidanyk, M.M. Maleina, A.A. Mokhov, O.O. Pervomayskyi, O.O. Prasov, L.V. Sannikova, I.Ya. Senyuta, Yu.D. Sergeev, D.I. Stepanov, R.O. Stefanchuk, S.G. Stetsenko, E.H. Shablova, A.E. Sherstobitov, E.D. Sheshenin, O.S. Shchukin, O.M. Shchukovskaya. Among foreign academics, we can mention E. Rita (Agency and Autonomy in Kant's Moral Theory: Selected Essays), P. Invagen (An Essay on Free Will), D. Grano (Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions), S. Harris (Free Will), S. Darvel (The Value of Autonomy and Autonomy of the Will), D. Easterbrook (The Determinants of Free Will), and others.

Research results.

The legal justification of the absoluteness of free will is impossible without defining absolute rights and freedom of will.

A right is absolute if it cannot be waived under any circumstances, so it can never be justifiably violated and must be respected without exceptions [Gewirth, 1981, p.2].

Absolute rights are the basis of any democratic and legal state, recognised as inviolable and protected by law [Абсолютні права, 2017]. Absolute rights are subjective rights; an indefinite and unlimited number of obliged persons opposes the bearers. The obligation consists in refraining from actions that violate absolute rights.

Absolute rights are the subject's rights, concerning which any other person is always obliged to refrain from actions that infringe these rights. They are fundamentally inviolable. The law protects absolute rights against an indefinite number of persons [Абсолютні права: Практика застосування термінів, слів та словосполучень у юриспруденції, 2007].

The definition of the absolute right to life, health, honour, dignity, personal integrity, education, work, private property, personal non-property rights, etc., is established. From the above, it can be assumed that absolute rights cannot be limited and violated, while relative rights can. But this approach does not correspond to reality. Legal norms can limit any rights, but the mechanism differs for absolute and relative rights. Therefore, the right cannot be characterised as absolute because it cannot be limited.

S.O. Slipchenko wrote in civil law that property rights, which can be limited but also limited fundamental rights to other people's property, are absolute. Certain rights to the results of intellectual and creative activity and personal non-property rights are also subject to restrictions. And this in no way affects their absolute nature [Slipchenko, 2014, p.68]. Therefore, absolute rights can also be limited, but exceptional circumstances must exist. For example, we can cite the restriction of human rights due to the Covid-19 pandemic, which was studied in detail by V. Savchenko, E. Michurin, and V. Kozhevnikova [Savchenko, Michurin, Kozhevnykova, 2022].

An exciting example is contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Clause 2 of Art. 4 prohibits derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 of this covenant. An analysis of these articles allows us to see that the said prohibition concerns the right to life (Article 6), freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and freedom from medical or scientific experiments without consent (Article 7), freedom from slavery and servitude state (Article 8), freedom from imprisonment for failure to fulfil a contractual obligation (Article 11), prohibition of retroactive effect of criminal laws (Article 15), freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18) [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966]. However, in these articles, the cases in which the restriction of this right is permitted are expressly established. For example, Art. 6. regulates that every person has an inalienable right to life, protected by law, and no one can be arbitrarily deprived of life. Arbitrary deprivation of life should be recognised as actions or inaction that led to the death of a natural person in violation of the legislation. Art. 2 of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms also contains a list of circumstances that allow the case to be interpreted as a "non-arbitrary" deprivation of life. Thus, the cases of the unavoidable need to use force, which may lead to loss of life, include the following: 1) when protecting any person from illegal violence; 2) when making a lawful arrest or preventing the escape of a person lawfully in custody; 3) in actions legally committed to suppressing a riot or mutiny [European Convention on Human Rights, Art.2]. The European Court of Human Rights and other international bodies for the protection of human rights consider reasonableness, expediency and the absolute necessity to be the main criteria in the legal evaluation of the facts of the use of force, including weapons, during the implementation of a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person who is legally detained [Tatsii and other, 2011, p.187].

Many examples of "legal" restriction of absolute rights can be given. Still, the main conclusion is that the restriction of absolute rights under clearly defined circumstances will not be considered a restriction. If such a thesis is questioned, we will come to a dead-end situation when it is allowed to limit a right that cannot be limited.

As we showed, the definition of a specific right as absolute is more connected not with the prohibition to limit it but with its significant meaning. This characterises them as a natural and

inalienable right, although not all absolute rights are. Returning to the issue of limiting absolute rights, we note that the grounds for this can again be seen in Art. 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It states that the freedom to practice one's religion or belief may be subject only to such restrictions as are provided by law and necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. This provision illustrates the principle we apply to other absolute rights by analogy: an absolute right may be limited only because it is provided by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. In such cases, we should not say that absolute right is limited. Having clarified this, we proceed to analyse the absolute nature of free will.

Freedom of will is not defined as an individual right in any international or national regulatory act. However, this does not mean that one does not have such a right, and freedom of the will has not undergone legal regulation. Speaking about free will as a human right, we should perceive it as a set of rights based on it and cannot exist without it. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights enshrines the absolute right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes the freedom to have or adopt the religion or belief of one's choice, as well as the freedom, individually or jointly with others, publicly or privately, to profess one's religion or faith in worship, rites, practice and teaching [European Convention on Human Rights, Art.18]. Undoubtedly, the right to freely practice one's religion directly manifests the individual's free will. Any person can choose a religion of his own free will or even create his own. Separately, this thesis is regulated by international treaties and national norms on the prohibition of discrimination. Because of this, it can be said that the absolute right to practice one's faith is based on freedom of will, which must have some legal definition. Free will can also be considered a right from which other rights arise. For example, from the absolute right to life comes the right to health care, which gives rise to a whole series of patient rights. This approach is constantly found in legislation.

Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also refers to the freedom of thought and conscience, which are also recognised as absolute rights. A wide range of normative acts confirms the absoluteness of these rights, in particular, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 2011]. Agreeing with M. Moore, we confirm that freedom of thought is the protection of the ability of people to think freely without interference, subject to only reasonable restrictions due to the rights of others or legitimately prevailing needs of society [Moore, 2022]. The ability to think freely is only possible with free will. This is confirmed by M. Karvovski and D. Kaufman, noting that thoughts can be considered actual acts of free will [Karwowski, Kaufman, 2017, p.76]. The right to freedom of conscience provides the opportunity to independently give an evaluative and qualitative description of one's actions. Conscience is the part of you that judges how moral your actions are and makes you feel guilty for bad things you have done or for which you feel responsible; the feeling that you know and must do what is right and must avoid doing what is wrong, and this makes you feel guilty when you have done what you know is wrong [Conscience].

In this case, we again see confirmation that the absolute right to freedom of thought cannot exist without freedom of will. Moreover, the impact on the freedom of will necessary for realising absolute rights raises the question of illegal interference with human rights. This issue is being studied in detail by scientists today. In particular, T. Douglas conducts an in-depth study of Protecting Minds: The Right to Mental Integrity and the Ethics of Rational Influence. The scientist studies how new forms of behavioural influence operate at the subnational level, bypassing the target person's ability to respond to causes. Examples include bottomless news feeds, randomised rewards, and other "persuasive" technologies used by online platforms and computer game developers. They also include biological interventions such as the use of drugs, nutritional supplements or non-invasive brain stimulation to facilitate the rehabilitation of criminals. The ethical acceptability of such rational influence depends on whether we have a moral right to mental integrity and, if so, what kinds of cognitive interference it excludes [Programme on the ethics of behavioural influence and prediction, 2020].

Conclusions. If we analyse all other absolute rights, we will see that free will is their basis. This is especially relevant for personal non-property rights that perform its protection function. Some of these rights cannot exist without free will, some can limit it, and others are a form of its realisation. In general, the conducted research makes it possible to assume that free will is one of the absolute rights from which all others originate. At the same time, free will can take the place of a personal non-property right or a principle of law. The answer to this question requires separate detailed research.

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ОСОБЛИВОСТІ РОЗВИТКУ СВІТОВОГО ГОСПОДАРСТВА ТА МЕВ

RUSSIA'S WAR AGAINST UKRAINE AS A GLOBAL THREAT TO FOOD SECURITY: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS

РОСІЙСЬКА ВІЙНА ПРОТИ УКРАЇНИ ЯК ГЛОБАЛЬНА ЗАГРОЗА ПРОДОВОЛЬЧОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ: КОРОТКОТЕРМІНОВІ ЕФЕКТИ

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Abstract. *The causal linkage between food security and global threats has not been fully resolved, whereas the relationship between food insecurity and armed conflict has been a key question in both policy and academic circles for recent decades. However, at both the global and national levels, the short-term impacts of such shocks on food security pillars is not well understood. Drawing on latest research and insights, this study attempted to prove that Russia's war against Ukraine is a global threat to food security and investigate the short-term war-induced effects on food security in the world. It overviews the reasons contributing to the current global food crisis, the impact on food security dimensions, as well as the global community responses. According to WFP-FAO report, the consequences of a looming food crisis may be more pronounced and ultimately the number of people facing acute food insecurity worldwide is expected to rise from currently 222 million people regarded food insecure globally. As far as the current food crisis goes on and the war continues it is difficult to assess future outcomes.*

Key words: *food security, threat, vulnerability, shock, armed conflict, war, supply disruptions, food inflation, food crisis.*

Анотація. *Причинно-наслідковий зв'язок між продовольчою безпекою та глобальними загрозами не є достатньо очевидним, тоді як зв'язок між порушенням продовольчої безпеки та збройними конфліктами протягом останніх десятиліть залишається актуальним дискусійним питанням як у політичних, так і в наукових колах. В той же час очікувана в короткостроковій перспективі трансформація концептуальних засад продовольчої безпеки*

потребує моніторингу та прогнозування як на національному, так і глобальному рівнях. Спираючись на останні дослідження та ідеї, авторами даного дослідження аргументовано, що війна росії проти України є глобальною загрозою продовольчій безпеці. Першочерговим завданням є дослідження нагальних короткострокових наслідків війни для продовольчої безпеки у світі. У статті розглядаються причини, що сприяють поточній глобальній продовольчій кризі, вплив загальноутворюючих факторів на параметри продовольчої безпеки, а також реакція світової спільноти на окремі факти їх деформації. Відповідно до звіту WFP-FAO, в найближчій перспективі очікуються вагомі наслідки продовольчої кризи, зокрема значне зростання кількості людей, які стикаються з гострою нестачею продовольства в усьому світі (на сьогодні їх кількість вже перевищує 222 мільйонів людей). Через нагальну тривалість війни та продовольчої кризи автори намагались визначити ключові тенденції формування безпекового середовища та оцінити стан глобальної продовольчої безпеки в найближчій перспективі.

Ключові слова*: продовольча безпека, загроза, вразливість, шок, збройний конфлікт, війна, перебої з постачанням, продовольча інфляція, продовольча криза.*

Introduction.

To begin with, global agrifood sector had already been disrupted and food prices had been elevated due to such global threat as COVID-19 pandemic when Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The invasion has exacerbated the already precarious situation of increased frequency and severity of climate shocks, regional conflicts and the pandemic by further disrupting food production and distribution, and driving up the cost of feeding people and families. In particular, FAO admits the primary responsibility of armed conflicts for the increase in global food insecurity since 2014 (FAO 2020). In November 2022, WFP estimates that up to 349 million people are acutely food insecure, or at risk, across 79 countries where it operates. This is an increase of 200 million people as compared to pre-pandemic levels (WFP 2022). Against this background, this paper analyses to what extent has the Russia's war against Ukraine contributed to the ongoing food crisis.

A food crisis is usually set off by a shock or combination of shocks that affect one or more of the pillars of food security. When a country is food secure, it means that "all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (HLPE 2020). Prior to COVID-19 pandemic the four food security pillars have been defined in the academic literature, namely, availability (sufficient quantity and quality of food), access (economic, social and physical), utilization (nutritional well-being) and stability (food security provision in the event of sudden shocks or cyclical events) (Varaksina 2015; Van & Meijerink 2014). However, a debate has evolved since 2020 on transforming food security definition with a view to global threats by adding to the four-above agency (socio-political government structures enable the achievement of food security) and sustainability (food needs are ensured in line with long-term regeneration of natural, social, and economic systems) pillars (HLPE 2020). In the context of this article we shall focus on availability, access, utilization and stability pillars when accessing the short-term effects of Russia's war against Ukraine on food security in the world.

The purpose of the article is to prove that Russia's war against Ukraine is a global threat to food security and investigate the short-term war-induced effects on food security in the world. This article takes a closer look at the vulnerabilities of countries to shocks in the global agricultural markets, with emphasis on the current example of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It overviews the reasons contributing to the current global food crisis, the impact on food security dimensions, as well as the global community responses in the short-term period.

Literature review.

Gephart J. et al (2016), Porkka M. et al. (2013), Kummu M. (2020) at al. claim that rapid globalisation has led to increasingly connected food systems. At the same time, Cottrell R. et al. and Woetzel J. et al. state that the frequency and severity of shocks to food systems has increased and this was associated with an increased number of socio-political (armed conflicts), climatic (extreme weather) and economic events (Cottrell 2019; Woetzel 2020). The threats affecting food security fall into 3 categories: 1) systemic threats (affect almost all types of economic activity); 2) threats destabilizing the process of food supply influencing production, import, logistics, market exchange and consumption; 3) threats to food security dimensions (Kurlyak 2018). Moreover, through global trade, food systems all over the world are becoming increasingly interconnected and interdependent, thus, the threats in one place can cause synchronous shocks across other regions and sectors (Buldyrev 2010; D'odorico 2015; Suweis 2015; Gephart 2017).

Food insecurity refers to the lack of secure access to enough safe and nutritious food for normal human growth and development and an active and healthy life (GRFC 2022). IMF experts observe that food insecurity has been rising since 2018. Whereas, a food crisis occurs when rates of acute food insecurity (of a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both) and malnutrition rise sharply at local or national levels, raising the need for emergency food assistance.

Main results of the research.

1.   Russia's war against Ukraine as a global threat to food security
The launch of Russia's war against Ukraine has revealed the interconnected nature of food systems by undermining availability, access, utilization and stability pillars of food security and subsequently generating the global food crisis. This was channeled through the influence of anthropogenic (armed conflict), economic (rise in global food prices) and natural factors (greater impact of crop failures due to disruption of global food supplies).

First, armed conflict affects food security in a variety of ways, both direct and indirect, from physical disruptions to agricultural production and food availability to disruptions that affect local trade, transport, and physical, social, and economic access to food (Brück & d'Errico 2019). Food availability becomes increasingly limited by reduced imports, and food access is curtailed by higher prices, lack of inputs and the destruction of productive assets and infrastructure. This creates complex humanitarian emergency that require holistic, coordinated responses from the international community.

The war undermined food security level in Ukraine in the above mentioned way. To cushion the negative effects, FAO developed USD 115.4 million Rapid Response Plan (RRP) to support the most vulnerable smallholder and medium‑sized farming households (979 320 people) through March–December 2022 (FAO 2022). The support included the provision of cash and agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, equipment, fuel, and livestock supplies), the maintenance of overall access to critical markets. However, further assistance and investments in Ukrainian agriculture will be needed once the war ends.

Second, for food import dependent countries even short-lived exaggerated price swings can have sustained effects on food prices. In addition, the opacity and high levels of concentration in supply chains create the real risk that consumer prices will continue at historically high levels, despite further price reduction. All this contributes to growing food inflation processes. As of October 2022, 113 countries have year-on-year food inflation of 10 percent or more, and it exceeds 15 percent in 67 countries, including three countries with triple-digit food inflation rates (WFP 2022).

Therefore, in the short-term period the war contributed to a sharp reduction in the volume of supply on the world food market and a rapid rise in prices of the main crops. The FAO Food Price Index has reached a record high in March 2022 (Monthly Food Price Index=160). As of October 2022 the index slightly decreased to 136 points, while remaining 2 % higher as compared

to 2021 value. For 2022, the Index also demonstrated nearly 50% yearly increase being the largest for the last two decades (See Table 1).

**Table 1: FAO Food Price Index (monthly and yearly data)**

Source: combined by authors based on FAO Food Price Index. Retrieved from https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/

UNCTAD experts also agree that the war represented a distributional shock (UNCTAD, 2022). Ukrainian agri-products of 2021/22 harvest were in stock, ready to be exported, but the primary export route via the Black Sea was abruptly closed. Initial uncertainty over how long the war would last inevitably sent prices higher. Though the Black Sea Grain Initiative was established in July 2022 enabling partially to resume Ukrainian grain exports, the immediate implications of the supply shock were especially severe for the Middle East and North Africa region that imports most of its grain from Ukraine.

Third, with a view to natural resource constraints and climate challenges food self-suffiency is not possible for all countries. Extreme weather and climate events are becoming more recurrent in many of the most food insecure areas of the globe, with floods, droughts, and hurricanes affecting the same vulnerable areas consecutively. Thus, international trade remains the key enabler of food security by smoothing climate-induced production shocks in individual countries and regions. In a broad term, it alleviates the uneven distribution across countries of land, water, and nutrient resources (Jiayi 2020). Therefore, even short-term food supply disruptions can lead to food emergency in the vulnerable countries.

At the beginning of 2022, according to WFP, weather extremes were the main drivers of acute food insecurity in seven countries leading to 23.5 million people in Crisis levels or worse (IPC/ CH Phase 3 or above). At the same time Russia's war against Ukraine continues to exacerbate food security in the world: a drop in food exports from Ukraine together with knock-on effects could further constrain global food supply. In addition, the war will adversely affect many low-income countries that mostly suffer from climate events and strongly rely on Ukraine as the closest supplier. IMF estimates the highest level of food insecurity to prevail in 48 countries.

Table 2: Map of 48 countries highly exposed to food insecurity

Source: https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/09/30/global-food-crisis-demands-support-for-people-open-trade-bigger-local-harvests

New estimates from the 79 countries where the World Food Programme (WFP) has an operational presence and where data is available show the number of acutely food insecure people will hit a record high of 349 million in 2022. This is an increase of 200 million people compared to pre-pandemic levels. An estimated 49 million people across 49 countries are in Emergency or worse levels of acute food insecurity in 2022 or Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) Phase 4+. As far as the impact of Russia's war against Ukraine is concerned, the largest increase in the number of food insecure people as compared to November 2021 data is observed in the Eastern Africa (+20 mln), MENA (+14 mln) and Western Africa (+11 mln). See Table 3.

Table 3: Number of acutely food insecure people, mln

Source: made by authors on the data sourced from WFP 2022

In general, Russia's war against Ukraine comes as a complex threat to food security in the world, as far as it destabilizes the process of global food supplies and endangers certain food security dimensions (availability, access, utilization and stability). As far as the current food crisis goes on and the war continues it is difficult to assess future outcomes. But with a view to the purpose of the article we can define three **key knock-on effects** for food security in the world, namely: 1) increased vulnerability of national food systems; 2) Ukraine's importance for global food security; 3) increased trade policy role for global food prices.

2. **Vulnerability of national food systems**

First, Russia's war against Ukraine has demonstrated the **vulnerability of national food systems** exposing their structural weaknesses, which have been felt unequally across households, firms and countries. Given the dependence of many countries on agriculture imports from Ukraine and Russia, food **access** has arguably been the most affected by the current cost-of-living crisis resulting in higher food prices**.** Whereas higher food prices together with higher energy prices and rapidly rising inflation have caused further hardship and serious food security risks specifically in low-income countries (OECD 2022).

According to country level economic vulnerability model by S.Raga and L.Pettinotti, vulnerability is measured as the combination of direct economic exposure to Ukraine and Russia (e.g., through bilateral trade and investment) and indirect exposure to the global effects of the war (e.g., through levels of commodity imports, trade and investment openness), minus resilience (e.g., quality of economic governance etc) to manage the negative knock off effects of the war (Raga & Pettinotti 2022).

Table 4: Country level economic vulnerability model

Exposure	
direct bilateral trade and investment •trade disruptions	indirect global effects of the war •increased global food, fertilizer, and fuel prices

↓

- Resilience
(fiscal space, reserves, debt, level of energy and food security)

↓

= Vulnerability

Source: made by authors based on (Raga & Pettinotti 2022)

In the short-term the economic impact of the ongoing war on food security will be felt far and wide mainly through agrifood trade disruptions and increased global food prices though to varying extent. In general, thanks to globalization of agrifood trade, many developed and developing countries are more resilient than previously as local shocks can be compensated by sourcing from areas further away (Gutiérrez-Moya 2021). Some countries, including China, the United States, and EU countries, are relatively well protected. They have high local production, high stock levels, and high purchasing power.

But some least developed and developing countries have slipped into a vulnerable situation. They rely heavily on grain imports, have limited stocks, and have low purchasing power. These countries may be hardest hit by food price increases. As food supplies constrict, these nations will face elevated inflation, which will exacerbate budgetary stress as they attempt to protect their populations from rising food prices.

- **Direct exposure (agrifood trade disruptions)**

The war challenges countries in the face of major threats and shocks resulting in key supply chains disruptions. Disruptions in agricultural exports from Russia and Ukraine, which jointly accounted for 24% of global wheat exports, 57% of sunflower seed oil exports and 14% of maize exports in 2016-20, is putting global food supply chains under strain, driving up food prices and creating a risk of global food crisis (Trade 2022).

According to IPC Technical Guidance Note as published in May 2022, the countries may face acute food insecurity due to the following reasons (IPC 2022):

1.Lower availability and higher price of wheat. This will be felt as exports of wheat from Ukraine (naval blockade of the Black Sea) and Russia (due to logistical and banking challenges) are severely curtailed by the war.

2.Rising price of vegetable oils. The war in Ukraine also affects the availability of other key products, such as sunflower and saffron oils. Even though most of these exports from Ukraine are typically not directed at IPC countries, the same ripple effects on prices of other global vegetable oils are being witnessed. As a result, according to IFPRI global vegetable oil prices have increased by around 30% since the start of the war.

3.Rising price of fuel, which has increased substantially during the crisis due to many buyers blocking imports from Russia and buying fuel from alternative suppliers, raising global fuel prices.

4.Higher price and lower availability of fertiliser. Russia is one of the largest exporters of fertilisers and fertiliser components. Sanctions affecting banking and transport have led to low

exports and some exporting countries have banned fertiliser exports. Fertiliser prices have increased globally (IFPRI 2022), and the situation is expected to remain problematic.

In addition to price effects, the war can also reduce the quantities available on world markets (Hellegers 2022). OECD projects that war-related disruptions are particularly likely for cereals and vegetable oils. Overall, the supply of these agricultural commodities is remarkably concentrated, with the five biggest suppliers covering more than half of the world export market, and almost to 80% in some cases. Such a high degree of concentration limits the scope for substitution to other producers in the short run, making these products particularly vulnerable to shocks.

- **Indirect exposure (increased food prices)**

The shockwaves are spreading through global markets and are putting increasing inflationary pressure on national agricultural industries. This means that, in the absence of government social safety nets, households will have no choice but to dedicate more of their budgets to buying food and this contributes to rising food inflation. Overall, food inflation implies that larger-than-usual share of consumer spending is dedicated to food purchases, and unemployment is high in many countries.

Two years of COVID-19 pandemic made the world economy rather fragile in terms of fiscal space. Today, 60 per cent of workers have lower real incomes than before the pandemic; 60 per cent of the poorest countries are in debt distress or at high risk of it; developing countries miss $1.2 trillion per year to fill the social protection gap (UNCTAD 2022-2). The war in Ukraine and its knock-on effects have also deteriorated the global environment. Therefore, the financial capacity of countries to protect themselves against such global threats as the war in Ukraine remains rather limited, thus, making them highly vulnerable.

Table 5: Nominal food inflation (Oct 2021/Sep 2022), % (yoy)

Source: made by authors based on data sourced from https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/40ebbf38f5a6b68bfc11e5273e1405d4-0090012022/related/Food-Security-Update-LXXII-October-27-2022.pdf

As can be observed from the Table 5, the record double digit food inflation is observed not only in developing countries (Africa, Latin America), but also in developed Europe as compared to 2021 level. In the end, rising prices are more damaging for net food-importing countries that are predominantly low-income economies. As the consumption basket of poorer people is dominated by food, food-price surges hurt the poor everywhere and threaten to push millions into poverty.

3. Ukraine's importance for global food security

Second, Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine has demonstrated **the importance of Ukrainian agricultural sector for global food security**, as far as Ukraine is a leading producer and exporter of agricultural commodities. In 2021, according to USDA, Ukraine was the world's largest producer of sunflower seeds and the largest exporter of sunflower oil, 3rd largest exporter of maize and rapeseed, 4th largest exporter of barley, and 5th largest exporter of wheat (FAS, 2022).

Therefore, the reliance on Ukraine as major global supplier of the above mentioned agrifood products has a significant impact on utilization pillar of food security. For instance, no other large sunflower oil exporter exists to rival Ukraine's global leadership (54% of world exports) and a prolonged conflict threatens the 2023 growing season, crushing facilities operation and overseas supplies (due to logistics problems). In the short-term period, the consumers in the world are already forced to pay exorbitant prices and eventually limit their consumption, whereas specifically European food makers are switching to more available alternatives (rapeseed, linseed, groundnut and palm oil). An unintended consequence of substituting sunflower oil in food products (snacks, prepared foods, pre-fried frozen products) for another vegetable oil is that it could alter their nutritional profile – and not always for the better.

Table 6: Ukraine's agriculture exports position in the world, 2021

Source: made by authors based on data sourced from (USDA 2022)

Moreover, current food system fragilities highlight the importance of **availability** dimension of food security. The countries dependent on Ukraine in terms of agrifood imports, are experiencing short-term supply chains disruptions. Prior to war, as of 2021 Ukraine was primary supplier of commodities to the World Food Program (WFP), feeding 400 million people across the world (WFP Staff Writers 2022). Therefore, the stability of Ukrainian agriculture sector is integral for the agrifood supplies stability in the whole world.

Table 7: Share of Ukraine in total imports, 2020 %

Source: OECD https://stat.link/qecg6r

For instance, the ongoing disruptions to agricultural exports from Ukraine could result in serious shortages in many developing economies, especially in Africa and the Middle East and Central Asia, and exacerbate food price increases that are already weighing on vulnerable social groups. See Table 7.

In general, the Russian aggression against Ukraine is undermining Ukraine's capacity to produce and export crops through (McKinsey 2022): 1)reduced harvest area (ongoing military actions and land mines); 2) farmers' lack of liquidity (inability to ship a large part of last year's harvest); 3) decreased yields (reduced access to fertilizers, disrupted crop production technologies, less advanced plant protection); and 4) ripple effects from increased fuel and fertilizer costs. The WFP estimates that Ukraine's 2022 harvest is expected to be 30 percent lower than in 2021, placing additional pressure on other producers to meet demand (WFP 2022-2). USDA forecast has also downgraded its 2022/23 harvest forecast for Ukraine. See Table 8.

Table 8: Ukraine's agriculture production, mln.t

Source: made by authors sourced from (USDA 2022)

As of September 2022, direct war damages to Ukraine's agricultural sector have reached $6.9 billion. (KSE 2022). Exports have been affected by closures of ports and oilseed crushing operations, rising energy and fertiliser prices are translating into higher production costs. Although the Black Sea Grain Initiative deal signed on July 22 has brought some relative relief to the market, enabling the price of some cereals to return to preinvasion levels. There are still uncertainties whether Russia will follow it in 2023.

4. Trade policy role for global food prices

Third, Russia's war against Ukraine has also highlighted the role of trade policies for global food price stability. To begin with, all countries have been actively using trade policy to respond to domestic needs when faced with potential food shortages since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. But trade policy actions on food and fertilizers have surged significantly since the beginning of the war in Ukraine.

In general, all food crises are distributional in nature. Economic and market disturbances and restrictions illustrate the importance of stability pillar of food security. COVID-19 has initially brought export restrictions and border closures later contributing to uncertainty on markets & inputs access, increased food price volatility and inflation. Rising global food prices have typically induced differential policy responses, as governments try to shield domestic markets from price surges. Some import-dependent countries lower import restrictions, and some food producing countries curb exports. As UNCTAD research shows, trade interventions contributed to an increase in world food prices of 13 percent during the 2008-11 global food crisis—and by 30 percent for wheat (Giordani 2016). Therefore, rising trade-policy interventions risk further disrupting global food markets.

The blockade of Black Sea ports caused by the war severely restricted food supply access. This situation has provoked numerous countries to try to protect their food access by curbing grain exports. As of October 21, 2022, the World Bank reports that twenty countries have implemented 25 food export bans, and eight have implemented 12 export-limiting measures (export taxes, export licensing) (WB 2022).

The scale of restrictions induced by the Russia's war against Ukraine has now surpassed the experience during the food price crisis in 2007/08, which contributed to 40 per cent agricultural prices increase (UNCTAD, 2022). Now export restrictions prevent the trade needed to bring essential food supplies and fertilizers to where they are most required. In one way or another, everyone is exposed to the shock waves of the war.

According to Global Trade Alert, during the first 10 months of 2022 a total of 605 trade policy interventions affecting food and fertiliser products have been recorded, of which G20 members were responsible for implementing 322. The worldwide total is up 79% over the comparable period of 2021 (GTA 2022).

Table 9: Trade policy interventions (time frame 1 January-31 October)

Source: made by authors sourced from (GTA 2022)

However, the current triple F (food, fuel, finance) crisis, induced by the war in Ukraine, is not over, thus, further export restrictions may be imposed. The possible way out of the food crisis is that other large agrifood exporters like the United States, Canada, the European Union, Australia, Argentina, Brazil — which together represent more than 50 percent of global exports of key staples like wheat, barley and corn — should not restrict their exports of staples (Ruta 2022). Thus, the security of these flows would allow markets for critical food products to continue working, helping to preserve the stability of global food markets until the war-induced effects will diminish.

Conclusion

To conclude, the article investigated the causal linkage between food security and such global threat as Russia's war against Ukraine. Overall, the impact has been highly negative for many countries in the world. The war has altered global patterns of trade, production, and consumption of commodities through supply chain disruptions, high and volatile energy, food and fertilizer prices and restrictive trade policies. This has resulted in the global increase of the number of acutely food insecure people.

With a view to the purpose of the article we defined three short-term knock-on effects of Russia's war against Ukraine for food security in the world. First, the vulnerability of national food systems has increased. Second, the importance of Ukraine's agriculture sector for global food security has been proved. Third, the role of trade policy for global food prices has been reiterated.

Overall, Russia's war against Ukraine comes as a complex threat to food security in the world, as far as it destabilizes the process of global food supplies and endangers certain food security dimensions (availability, access, utilization, stability). As far as the current food crisis goes on and the war continues it is difficult to assess future outcomes. Despite the reprieve in global food prices and the resumption of grain exports from the Black Sea, food remains beyond reach for many due to high prices and weather shocks.

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USE OF THE KEY RISK INDICATORS METHOD IN RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

ВИКОРИСТАННЯ МЕТОДУ КЛЮЧОВИХ ПОКАЗНИКІВ РИЗИКУ В СТРАТЕГІЯХ РИЗИК-МЕНЕДЖМЕНТУ

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Abstract. *As part of the rapid development of the global economy in recent decades, a clear demand for timely and effective response to changes in the macroeconomic environment of the multinational enterprises (MNE), as well as the influence of endogenous factors on the achievement of operational and strategic goals of the enterprise, is created within the framework of the corporate governance structure of MNE. Such changes and factors can create both risks and opportunities for MNE. As part of the strategic planning processes, modern MNE must identify and assess risks and opportunities in relation to the key objectives of their strategy and assess the potential change in the risk profile of the enterprise, if there are changes in the strategy and any of its sensitivity to internal or external factors. Existing and new risk management strategies should become an integrated part of the operational and strategic planning process of MNE. At the same time, an effective system of key risk indicators (KRI) is an important component of an effective risk management strategy of MNE, based on a holistic approach to the organizational structure of MNE and taking into account the geographical, functional, operational specifics of the enterprise's business.*

Applying a natural methodological basis, the article describes the concepts and principles of KRI, their typology and the order of determination. As part of the practical analysis, the role and place of KRI in the system of operational and strategic activity of MNE were determined, as well as a study of the use of KRI was carried out on the example of the collapse of the US residential real estate market in 2007.

The conducted study showed the high efficiency of the practical use of KRI to achieve the goals of MNE and increase the efficiency of their business activities.

Key words: *risk management strategy, risk management, key risk indicator.*
JEL Classification: *D81, G32, G34, L21, M16*

Анотація. *В рамках стрімкого розвитку світового господарства останніх десятиліть в рамках структури корпоративного урядування багатонаціональних підприємств (БНП) створюється чіткий запит на вчасне та ефективне реагування на зміни*

в макроекономічному середовищі діяльності БНП, а також впливу ендогенних факторів на досягнення операційних та стратегічних цілей підприємства. Такі зміни та фактори можуть створювати як ризики, так і можливості для БНП. В рамках процесів стратегічного планування сучасні БНП мають проводити ідентифікацію та оцінку ризиків і можливостей по відношенню до ключових цілей своєї стратегії та оцінювати потенційну зміну в профілі ризику підприємства, якщо є зміни в стратегії та будь-яка її чутливість до внутрішніх або зовнішніх факторів. Існуючі та нові стратегії ризик-менеджменту мають стати інтегрованою частиною процесу операційного та стратегічного планування БНП. Водночас дієва система ключових показників ризику (Key risk indicator, KRI) є важливою складовою ефективної стратегії ризик-менеджменту БНП, базуючись на холістичному підході стосовно організаційної структури БНП та враховуючи географічну, функціональну, операційну специфіку бізнесу підприємства.

Застосовуючи природничу методологічну основу, в рамках статті проведений опис понять та принципів показників KRI, їх типологія та порядок визначення. В рамках практичного аналізу визначені роль та місце показників KRI у системі операційної та стратегічної діяльності БНП, а також проведене дослідження використання показників KRI на прикладі краху ринку житлової нерухомості США 2007 року.

Проведене дослідження показало високу ефективність практичного використання показників KRI для досягнення цілей БНП та підвищення ефективності їх бізнесової діяльності.

Ключові слова: *стратегія ризик-менеджменту, управління ризиками, ключовий показник ризику.*

JEL Classification: *D81, G32, G34, L21, M16*

1. Introduction

Shortening the duration of economic cycles of the world economy, rapid internationalization, and the development of multinational enterprises (MNE) in the last two decades emphasized the relevance and urgency of developing effective tools for timely management of response to such changes. One of the fundamental elements of the MNE corporate governance system is the monitoring of trends and indicators that provide relevant information that serves to make timely decisions and focus on the most urgent aspects. Endogenous and exogenous environmental factors can create both risks and opportunities for MNE. That is why the formation of an effective system of key risk indicators, which, on the one hand, allows judging the level of susceptibility of the MNE to a specific risk, its dynamics over time, and on the other hand, signals a change in the level of risk and the effectiveness of measures for its management.

As the key risk indicators are critical predictors of adverse events, they can also serve as an effective part of the budget planning process and help align MNE priorities with the changes and uncertainties an enterprise is experiencing.

2. Basic concepts and principles of key risk indicators

The concept of key risk indicators (KRI) must be considered through the risk management process as part of the risk management strategy of multinational enterprises (MNE), an important stage of which is risk monitoring and reporting. The most effective method of this stage is the use of KRI.

In general, indicators are indicators used to monitor identified risks over a period of time. Any piece of data that can perform this function is a risk indicator. An indicator can be considered a risk indicator if it can be used to measure the impact of a particular risk or set of risks. An indicator becomes "key" when it tracks a particularly important risk (key risk) of the MNE and/or does so particularly effectively (key indicator). The main task of KRI is early notification of a change in the level of risk, the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures (including control), as well as for risk monitoring.

KRI play an important role in the risk management strategy of MNE, providing the

following information [*Kirvan*]:

- advance notification of potential risks that may harm MNE;
- understanding of possible weaknesses in BNP monitoring and control tools;
- continuous monitoring of risks between risk assessment cycles within the framework of the relevant process.

It should be noted that the task for MNE is not only to define risk indicators as key, that is, the most important, but also to ensure internal acceptance of its KRI. MNE must communicate risk warnings in such a way that every employee in the organization clearly understands their meaning and can respond accordingly.

In the internal corporate etymology of MNE, it is important to distinguish KRI from key performance indicators (KPI), which are indicators that help MNE assess progress in achieving stated goals.

KRI and KPI are functionally opposite to each other. Although they may be separate and distinct for some issues, the creation of one often leads to the creation of the other as its complement.

KRI provide information on risks and their potential impact on MNE business performance. They function as early warning tools to monitor, analyse, manage and mitigate key risks. In contrast, KPI demonstrate how well MNE is achieving its goals and objectives, such as sales, revenue, and customer satisfaction.

Table 1 provides examples of key performance indicators and their corresponding risks and KRI [*Kirvan*]:

Key performance indicator, KPI	Risk	Key risk indicator, KRI	
		Description	**Measurement example**
Staff			
Full-time employment is required for the optimal operation of MNE	Loss of staff	Monthly dynamics of the number of employees	The total number of employees is reduced by 20% or more
Employee satisfaction with the enterprise and their work is important for successful work	Employee dissatisfaction	Monthly dynamics of the number of employee complaints	The number of employee complaints increases by 15% or more every month
Production processes			
Production of an important product is maintained at a level sufficient to meet demand	Production of a key product is not keeping up with demand	Weekly change in warehouse stocks of a key product	The volume of warehouse stocks of a key product is reduced by 20% or more
The existing product design is satisfactory and delivers the expected value and results for customers	Existing product designs are becoming increasingly outdated and may lead to reduced sales	Monthly sales dynamics of products whose design has not changed over the past year	Product sales fell by 20% or more compared to the previous level
Information technology			
IT system disruptions due to cyber-attacks are minimized through regular patching of cyber security	Disruption of IT systems due to cyber attacks	Execution of the schedule of corrections of the cyber security system	Cyber security patching is two patches behind the planned and recommended level

systems			
Business disruption is minimized as systems, files and databases are backed up to their last recovery point	Failure to restore systems, data files, and databases to their current state after a crash due to a backup failure	Running a backup schedule	Backup system notification when backup level drops below a minimum acceptable time period

Table 1. Difference between key performance indicators (KPI), risks and key risk indicators (KRI)

At the same time, for effective use in the operational activities of MNE, the developed KRI should follow the following principles:

1. According to the "*Effectiveness*" principle, the key risk indicator should meet the following requirements:
   - relate to the specific risk of MNE;
   - be measured over a reported or forecasted time period;
   - have an objective (historical or predictive) justification;
   - measure the quantitative characteristics of the process exposed to potential risk (for example, the probability of occurrence, the amount of losses);
   - contain information for making a management decision.

2. According to the principle of "*Following*", the key risk indicator should meet the following requirements:
   - adhere to the initial unit of measurement (percentages, proportions, shares);
   - be accurate enough (no more than 2-5% deviation is allowed during data processing);
   - be able to adapt in the event of a change in the assessment methodology and/or performance of the business function;
   - to be formed from the primary sources of MNE business processes.

3. According to the "*Ease of Use*" principle, the key risk indicator should meet the following requirements:
   - be available and open (without a need to form additional requests);
   - not be costly in the process of data collection;
   - be easy for perception and further analysis.

As part of the development of key risk indicators, it is also important to identify the three main characteristics of KRI [*Rodriguez A., Chadha V.*, 2016]:

1. *Dynamicity*. KRI are dynamic in nature, so the process of defining, implementing, and using of KRI should not be linear or done only once. As the risk environment changes, the list of indicators should be refined to reflect changes in the risk profile, strategy, and internal and external environments. Continuous review and improvement are required to ensure that the most significant KRI are monitored, timely and high-quality data is obtained, appropriate thresholds are established, and appropriate escalation protocols are in place. An initial set of KRI will not be 100% comprehensive, developing effective KRI is an ongoing process.

2. *Multidimensionality*. KRI metrics should include the full context of the situation. For example, counting "unsuccessful trades" does not say anything about the trading process itself. However, when combined with another metric, "trading volume," this pair provides perspective and holistic view. A multidimensional indicator can be a percentage of failed deals by deal volume. From this perspective, an increase in volume may indicate an increase in failures, but the ratio is constant and does not trigger any action.

3. *Relevance*. It is important that the determined KRI are relevant for MNE. Such relevance can be achieved by the following approaches:

a. **Top-down approach** involves reviewing MNE strategy, highlighting strategic goals. Mapping key risks to key strategic initiatives provides an opportunity to begin identifying top-line indicators that can serve as leading KRI to monitor the execution of MNE's key strategic initiatives. KRI mapped to key risks and key strategic initiatives reduce the likelihood that MNE management will be distracted by other information that may be less important to achieving MNE goals.

b. **Bottom-up approach** is the result of spreading a wide net across multiple metrics that are captured within the organization. With the help of expert knowledge, analysis of historical trends, lessons learned, and other qualitative or quantitative information, risk managers can begin to align the list of indicators with the identified key risks. This refinement will take some time.

3. Role model and structure of the key risk indicators system

An effective system of key risk indicators is an important component of an effective risk management strategy of MNE. That is why the role model of such a system should be based on a holistic approach to the organizational structure of MNE and take into account the geographical, functional, operational specifics of the enterprise's business. The RACI matrix is the most effective method of forming a role model of the system of key risk indicators of MNE. It provides for the division of all system participants according to four functions [*Miranda D., Watts R.*, 2022]:

- *R (responsible)* – responsible for development;
- *A (accountable)* – responsible for the step as a whole, approves the results;
- *C (consulted)* – consults before implementation, agrees;
- *I (informed)* – informed after execution.

In order to form the basic role model of MNE KRI system, it is necessary to define four typical roles within the framework of the MNE organizational structure [*Rodriguez A., Chadha V.*, 2016]:

- *Leader* – this person provides leadership and management of the KRI system;
- *Steward* – this person is responsible for collecting, validating data quality, and posting KRI information to a system or location as defined by the KRI framework. In some cases, this may be the same person as the KRI;
- *KRI owner* – is the person responsible for monitoring and first responding to KRI;
- *KRI analytics team* – is the person or team responsible for the overall analysis of the aggregate of all KRI for further reporting to MNE management.

According to the typical roles outlined above within the organizational structure of BNP, the role model of the system of key risk indicators according to the RACI matrix method will look according to Table 2.

Action	MNE Management	Leader	KRI analytics team	KRI owner	Steward	Heads of business functions
Governance system	A	R		R		R
KRI identification		A		R		
KRI assessment		A		C	R	
Collection of data on KRI		A		C	R	
Data quality assurance		C		R	A	
KRI data posting		I	I	R		
Setting KRI		A		R		

thresholds						
Analysis (overall)		A	R			
Analysis (KRI level)		A		R		
Reporting (aggregated)	I	A	R			
Reporting (functional)		A	C	C		R
Effectiveness evaluation		A		R		I

Table 2. Role model of the system of key risk indicators according to the RACI matrix method

One of the key components of the MNE KRI system is the analysis of the collected data. Analysis and synthesis of a large set of structured and unstructured information can be a serious challenge for MNE, as it is important not only to collect information, but also to isolate dependencies that lead to an understanding of both existing risks and emerging risks. Participants of the KRI system need to do more than simply review and transmit data, they must help the recipients of the provided information understand it. The KRI analytics team can reduce the volume of data several times as part of its evaluation and formation of context and narrative. The team can evaluate structured and unstructured information using the following methods:

- *Comparison of data points*. Similar data points in time can be useful comparisons to understand the directionality or similarity of information. The KRI system can use past and current collected data to determine trends and dynamics.

- *Evaluation of datasets*. Looking at metrics that share common points of relationship provides a more complete picture of the element being measured: a strategic objective, risk appetite, enterprise risk, or key control element.

- *Trend analysis*. Viewing specific KRI data over a period of time allows to assess embedded patterns and gain a more accurate view of an existing or potential trend.

- *Changes in the business environment*. A comprehensive view of the occurrence of past and expected future changes contributes to the analysis and structuring of information. Assessment of the business environment is a structured process that identifies important changes that may affect MNE or its key elements (strategy, market share, regulatory reporting, etc.). The process of assessing the business environment consolidates the vision of what is changing and becomes an effective basis for the formation of KRI.

- *Building connections*. Risks usually do not exist in isolation and the whole cannot be the sum of its parts. Therefore, considering KRI as individual variables to generate risk alerts is not as effective as considering them as a system. A systemic view allows for the identification of interrelated variables as a holistic picture of risk. Making connections requires applying intuitive methods of analysis, using internal and external data, and testing theories. Links often need to be confirmed with subject matter experts who own processes or controls at different levels in MNE.

The design and development of a KRI system should cover the entire KRI life cycle from identification and creation to re-evaluation and deletion. An effective system also establishes governance relationships that should be consistent with the overall organizational structure of MNE.

An important element of the KRI system within the organizational structure of MNE is the determination of KRI threshold values, which act as a tool for controlling and monitoring the status of risk drivers, the exceeding of which is a signal to MNE management to make appropriate risk management decisions. Determination of threshold values of key risk indicators can be carried out on the basis of the following approaches:

- *An objective approach* involves taking into account the limitations that exist in the legislation and internal documents of the MNE.

- *A subjective approach* involves the use of expert judgment based on the results of a survey or questionnaire of risk owners or other key employees of MNE. With this approach, experts, on the basis of available experience and knowledge, determine the limit level (acceptable level) of the key risk indicator.

4. Typology and procedure for determining key risk indicators

Within the framework of the system of key risk indicators, the typology of KRI based on the general attributes of the indicators, which are based on the following characteristics [*Rodriguez A., Chadha V., 2016*]:

- *Primary use*: this attribute describes the primary intended use of the indicator, i.e., its relationship to the risk profile, level of control or performance against the MNE's business objectives.
- *Additional use*: although an indicator usually has a primary profile that it informs, there may be additional uses that, when combined with other metrics, provide additional information and a more holistic approach to a different task or monitoring.
- *Measurability*: KRI should be measurable. Even with a qualitative assessment, there should be a quantitative measure to provide an understanding of the measure.
- *Globality*: KRI can be common to different jurisdictions or lines of business of MNE, when the collection of information on the indicator takes place locally, and the measurement is centralized. Local KRI for different jurisdictions or specific KRI for individual lines of business may also be developed.
- *Time period*: KRI can be current, lagging, or leading (sometimes more than one, depending on usage).

The most widespread typology of KRI within the risk management strategy of MNE is the typology according to the time period. It can be used not only in MNE, but also in the analysis of the world economy. Below is a detailed description of the KRI according to the time period and their application for macroeconomic analysis.

Current KRI reflect the existing state of the metric or tend to move with the risk profile they measure. They are also used in macroeconomic analysis where the current KRI may be the employment rate, real earnings, average hours worked per week in manufacturing, and the unemployment rate.

Lagging KRI change when the tracked event changes. They can confirm trends, but not predict them. Economic examples of lagging indicators are unemployment, GNP profits, unit labor costs, and interest rates. During data analysis, trends in lagging KRI can form a leading indicator representation.

Leading KRI change before the risk they measure becomes apparent, such as a measurable economic factor that changes before the economy begins to follow a particular pattern or trend. Leading KRI can predict changes in the economy, but are not always accurate.

In macroeconomic analysis, lagging KRI change as the economy as a whole changes, current KRI show the current state of the economy, and leading KRI show where the economy is headed. All three of these KRI types can be used in combination to get a complete picture of where the economy has been and how it is expected to change in the future.

The procedure for determining KRI can be based on two methodological approaches:
1. *Based on risk factors*:
- key risk factors are determined for each selected risk. Each factor is analyzed for measurability, that is, for each risk factor, measurement units are determined (where possible), as well as the frequency of measurement of the indicator and the source of information for calculation;
- based on the risk factor, KRI are developed, which can be expressed in the form of coefficients, percentages, numbers, etc. After determining the KRI, their threshold values are determined;

• threshold values are a tool for controlling and monitoring the state of risk factors; threshold breakage is a signal to MNE management to make appropriate decisions on risk management.

2. *Based on risk mitigation measures*:

• for each risk mitigation measure, a unit of measurement of the level of performance of this measure must be defined, as well as a frequency of measuring the indicator and the source of information for calculation;

• the level of implementation of measures will be KRI. KRI developed on the basis of risk mitigation measures can be expressed as a percentage (percentage completed) or as an actual completion (completed or not completed);

• after determining the KRI, threshold values are determined for each KRI, which serve as a tool for controlling and monitoring the state of risk and implementing measures to reduce it.

5. The role and place of key risk indicators in the system of operational and strategic activities of MNE

The processes of implementation of the KRI system in operational and strategic planning, risk appetite of MNE should be clearly organized and coordinated in order to maximize the effectiveness of information use. That is why existing and new risk management strategies should be integrated into the general processes of operational and strategic planning of MNE.

During the strategic planning process, it is necessary to identify and assess risks in relation to the key objectives of the MNE strategy and assess the potential change in the risk profile of the enterprise, if there are changes in the strategy and any of its sensitivity to external factors. For example, a change in macroeconomic conditions and global economic prospects may encourage MNE to internationalize or regionalize its business. The study of such changes provides information for re-evaluation of existing or development of new KRI indicators, changes in their threshold values.

The MNE's strategic planning process can use KRI as input, which should be linked to existing strategic objectives. The trend or level of these KRI should provide a significant contribution to the implementation of the MNE strategy, and in the framework of portfolio analysis can signal its macroeconomic sensitivity.

As part of the system of operational and strategic activities, it is also important to understand how effective the developed KRI are, that is, how well the KRI system functions from the point of view of forming expectations regarding the future functioning of the MNE business. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the KRI system within the risk management strategy of MNE depends on the following internal corporate determinants of MNE [*Rodriguez A., Chadha V., 2016*]:

• *Data quality* – data quality assessment addresses any known issues with information quality, the level of control and performance of the quality control process, and problems or control failures identified by any source that are relevant to data quality.

• *Data collection* – assessing whether any kind of problems occurred during data collection. Problems can be related to supply failures (technical or process problems) or timeliness issues.

• *Follow-up steps* – assessment of whether actions have been taken in accordance with violations of threshold values.

Retrospective analysis also serves as an effective tool for analysing the effectiveness of the KRI system. As part of such an analysis, actual MNE losses are considered and a conclusion is drawn whether specific KRI predicted the realization of such a risk and, if so, what preventive measures were in place. If KRI for such losses were missing, this highlights the gap and should trigger the risk identification process. The results of the KRI system effectiveness checks and

internal corporate determinants determine the need to re-evaluate the KRI for relevance and practicality in relation to the BNP business.

6. Practical use of key risk indicators on the example of the 2007 US housing market crash

In 2007, the US economy entered into a mortgage crisis that led to panic and financial turmoil around the world and a recession that began the following year, damaging financial markets. In early 2007, the British multinational bank HSBC reported the first of its large losses related to subprime mortgage securities. Hundreds of mortgage companies failed, insurance companies such as American International Group (AIG) and international investment banks such as Bear Stearns were not spared. Other firms were bought at low prices or were on the verge of collapse, as in the case of Citigroup. The problems were so serious that one of the largest financial institutions in the world with huge reserves of capital, Lehman Brothers, was forced to file for bankruptcy. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 greatly destabilized the global financial system.

Bailouts from national governments, downturns in major financial markets, BNP bankruptcies, declining consumer welfare and reduced economic activity were just some of the effects of the global crisis of 2007-2008. It was attributed to a number of factors, not just the participants in the housing and lending market, but the main reason was the housing bubble due to the growth of subprime lending.

The genesis of the mortgage crisis and the collapse of the US housing market in 2007 was as follows [*DeGrace T., 2011*]:

- **2001**: The US Federal Reserve System (FRS) lowered the federal funds rate from 6.5% to 1.75%.
- **2002**: Annual home prices rose 10% or more in California, Florida and most of the north-eastern states, the highest rate since 1980. In June, US President George W. Bush set a goal of increasing the number of minority homeowners by at least 5,5 million by 2010 through tax breaks and subsidies. National Mortgage Association Fannie Mae has committed $440 billion to NeighborWorks America, a community development support organization.
- **2003**: Fannie Mae and home mortgage lender Freddie Mac purchased $81 billion worth of subprime securities. In June, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan cut the key interest rate to 1%, the lowest level in 45 years. In December, President George W. Bush signed the American Dream Down Payment Act to provide a down payment grant of $10,000 or 6% of the purchase price of a home, whichever is greater. In addition, they committed to reforming the home buying process, which would reduce closing costs by approximately $700. The US President's administration expected these measures to further stimulate home ownership for all Americans. During the year, banks, mortgage underwriters and other lenders abandoned credit standards (employment history, income, down payments, credit score, assets, loan-to-value ratio and ability to service debt), instead emphasizing the lender's ability to securitize and repackage subprime loans.
- **2004**: US homeownership hits all-time high of 69.2%. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has raised Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's affordable housing goals for the next four years from 50 percent to 56 percent, saying they lag behind the private market. From 2004 to 2006, they purchased $434 billion worth of subprime securities. In October, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suspended the net capital rule for five companies: Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and Morgan Stanley. Freed from government-imposed limits on debt ratios, these firms pushed them up to 20, 30, and even 40 to one. Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii and Nevada recorded price increases of more than 25% per year.
- **2005**: Correction of the residential real estate market began. In February, the Office of Thrift Supervision introduced new rules that allowed savings and loans banks with more than $1 billion in assets to meet their obligations under the Community Reinvestment Act without investing in local communities, reducing the availability of subprime loans. In September, the Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation, the FRS and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency allowed the Community Reinvestment Act's requirements to be relaxed for "small" banks, further shrinking subprime loans. From the fourth quarter of 2005 to the first quarter of 2006, average home prices decreased by 3,3% nationwide. During 2005, less than 1% of all households were in some stage of foreclosure.

- **2006**: The slowdown in the residential real estate market continues. Prices remained flat and home sales fell, leading to inventory build-up. The level of foreclosures on residential real estate began to rise.

- **2007**: In the first quarter of the year, the S&P/Case-Shiller home price index recorded the first annual decline in nationwide home prices since 1991. The subprime mortgage industry collapsed, foreclosures rose, and rising interest rates threatened to push prices down even more as problems in the subprime markets spilled over into the prime mortgage markets. The level of foreclosures on residential real estate has increased significantly.

- **2008**: Home sales continued to fall. Fears of a US recession rose, while global stock markets saw a correction and volatility. In January, Bank of America, the largest U.S. bank by market value, agreed to buy financial group Countrywide Financial for about $4 billion. In March, the FRS agreed to guarantee $30 billion of investment bank Bear Stearns' assets to support its government-sponsored sale to investment bank JPMorgan Chase. In September, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed under external governance. During the week of September 15-22, 2008:
  - Lehman Brothers collapsed;
  - Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of America;
  - Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became bank holding companies;
  - The insurance company AIG was saved;
  - The Reserve Fund was bailed out and other money market mutual funds were guaranteed;
  - Banks and financial intermediaries around the world stopped lending;
  - Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson have asked Congress for $770 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Funds; Congress initially refused;
  - The US stock market (Dow) fell more than 700 points in one day;
  - As of the end of the year, the number of foreclosures on residential real estate increased by 81% compared to 2007.

- **2009**: as of the end of the year, the number of foreclosures on residential real estate increased by 21% compared to 2008.

The 2007 US mortgage crisis and housing market collapse had serious long-term consequences for the US and European economies. The US entered a deep recession when nearly nine million jobs, roughly 6% of the labour force, were lost during 2008 and 2009. Production losses due to the crisis amounted to at least 40% of the gross domestic product in 2007. US home prices fell by an average of nearly 30%, and the U.S. stock market fell by about 50% by the start of 2009 [*Feldstein M., 2009*].

As of early 2013, the US stock market had recovered to its pre-crisis peak, but home prices remained near record lows and unemployment remained high. Economic growth remained below the pre-crisis level. Europe also continued to struggle with its own economic crisis, with high unemployment and severe bank losses estimated at €940 billion between 2008 and 2012.

From the conducted analysis, it can be concluded that the mortgage crisis and the collapse of the US housing market in 2007 had a number of risk factors. Table 3 shows examples of key risk indicators, the timely consideration of which would have given all market participants clear signals about the approaching crisis.

№	Risk factor	Key risk indicator (KRI)	KRI value and its interpretation
1	**Low interest rates**	US FRS rate	• US Fed interest rates were historically low in 2003 and 2004 but began to rise after FRS began tightening monetary policy in mid-2004. Between 2004 and 2006, FRS raised interest rates 17 times, from 1% to 5,25%. Then, rate hikes stalled amid concerns that an accelerating downturn in the housing market could undermine the economy as a whole. • Economists ignored the sign because interest rates were still much lower than in previous recessions and the economy had enough liquidity to fuel growth.
2	**New residential real estate construction**	The number of issued permits for housing construction	• In November 2006, the number of issued housing permits fell by 28%, according to FRS report. • High employment, low inflation and rising consumer spending were expected to pull real estate out of recession by late spring 2007.
3	**Rising of housing prices**	Changes in residential property prices	From 1997 to 2006, residential real estate prices in the US increased by an average of 124%.
4	**Increase in subprime lending**	Growth of subprime mortgage loans	The growth of subprime mortgage loans changed from +8% in 2004 to +20% in 2006.
5	**Increase in household indebtedness**	Change in household debt as a percentage of income	The level of household debt as a percentage of income increased from 77% in 1990 to 127% at the end of 2007.
6	**Reduction of the risk premium**	The average difference in mortgage interest rates between subprime and prime mortgages	The average difference in mortgage interest rates between subprime and prime mortgages decreased from 2,8% in 2001 to 1,3% in 2007.
7	**Lowering lending standards**	1. The frequency of loan rejections 2. Loan-to-value ratio 3. Reporting suspicious activity	1. The frequency of loan rejections decreased from 29% in 1998 to 14% in 2002 and 2003. 2. The average loan-to-value ratio for home equity loans was 100% for mortgage loans issued in 2005, 2006 and the first half of 2007. Three years ago, the average subprime borrower made a 10% down payment on a home. 3. According to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the number of reports of suspicious activity increased by 1,411% between 1997 and 2005.
8	**Increase in risky products**	The share of variable rate mortgages in the subprime mortgage	More than 90% of subprime mortgage loans in 2006 were variable rate.

№	Risk factor	Key risk indicator (KRI)	KRI value and its interpretation
		portfolio	
9	**Growth in the volume of subprime mortgage securities**	Volumes of subprime mortgage securities in investment portfolios	Growth of subprime mortgage securities in investment portfolios from 54% in 2001 to 75% in 2006.

Conclusions

The high volatility and dynamism of the macroeconomic environment in recent decades have once again emphasized the critical importance for multinational enterprises (MNE) to have a clear approach to timely managerial response to such changes. As part of the strategic planning processes, modern MNE must identify and assess risks in relation to the key objectives of their strategy and assess the potential change in the risk profile of the enterprise, if there are changes in the strategy and any of its sensitivity to endogenous factors. That is why existing and new risk management strategies should be integrated into the general processes of operational and strategic planning of MNE.

At the same time, an effective system of key risk indicators (KRI) is an important component of an effective risk management strategy of MNE, based on a holistic approach to the organizational structure of MNE and taking into account the geographical, functional, operational specifics of the enterprise's business. MNE strategic planning process can use KRI as input, which should be linked to existing strategic objectives. The trend or level of such KRI should provide a significant positive contribution to the implementation of MNE strategy, and within the portfolio analysis may signal its macroeconomic sensitivity and correlation with exogenous factors.

The analysis of the genesis and consequences of the mortgage crisis and the collapse of the US residential real estate market in 2007 showed the high effectiveness of the practical use of KRI to achieve the goals of MNE and improve the efficiency of business activities, and the timely consideration of a number of risk-creating factors of the crisis, the levels and trends of the relevant KRI would have given all market participants clear signals about its approach.

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ЗМІСТ

ПОЛІТИЧНІ ПРОБЛЕМИ МІЖНАРОДНИХ ВІДНОСИН

СУЧАСНА СИСТЕМА МІЖНАРОДНОГО ПРАВА

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